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BOARD GATEKEEPERS
Yaron Nili*
ABSTRACT
For the last decade, investors, scholars, and regulators have turned to
independent directors in key leadership positions as a means to safeguard
corporate boards’ ability to serve as a robust check on management’s power.
As a result, a vast majority of public companies’ boards are now led by an
Independent Chair, or, alternatively, include a Lead Independent Director.
These ostensible outsiders—which this Article calls “board gatekeepers”—
are meant to be even more empowered and detached from management
compared to the rest of the board. This allows them to serve an independent
gatekeeping function—a necessary guardrail against management’s ability to
exert undue control over the boardroom. But a closer look at board gatekeepers
paints a concerning reality. Through a hand-collected dataset and interviews
with directors and general counsels, this Article reveals, for the first time, that
installing board gatekeepers is not the cure-all it seems. Instead, board
gatekeepers are often deprived of the powers necessary to rebalance the
boardroom dynamic and, in many cases, their own independence is questionable
at best—and recognizing them as such has numerous theoretical and practical
implications.
This Article makes two key contributions to the literature. First, using a firstof-its-kind, hand-collected, and coded dataset of 900 public companies, it
exposes the unfettered discretion companies have in designating gatekeepers’
independence and powers—revealing that many board gatekeepers are in fact
gatekeepers in title only, lacking both the independence and powers that are
critical to their role. Second, this Article uses the context of board gatekeepers
to illuminate the inherent difficulty with relying on an abstract concept of
independence, underscoring the importance of what it terms “functional

*
Associate Professor of Law and Smith-Rowe Faculty Fellow in Business Law, University of Wisconsin
Law School. The Author would like to thank John Coates, Jens Dammann, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani,
Cathy Hwang, Kobi Kastiel, Elizabeth Pollman, Roy Shapira, and the participants at the Israeli Institute for
Advanced Studies Seminar, the 2022 Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Workshop, the Texas Law School
Business Law Seminar, the 2021 American Law and Economics Annual Conference, the 2021 National Business
Law Scholars Conference, the Association of American Law School Annual Meeting, Business Law Section
Work in Process Workshop, and the University of Wisconsin Faculty Workshop. Jasmine Chen, Megan
Christopher, Cody Ciura, Katie Gresham, Adam Mazin, Connor Muth, Derek Thomas, Peter Tirella, and
Gretchen Winkel provided excellent research assistance. I am especially grateful to the editorial staff of the
Emory Law Journal for their exceptional suggestions and edits.

92

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:91

independence.” Recognizing that companies with faux gatekeepers may pose
specific governance concerns, this Article then offers several policy
recommendations to ensure gatekeepers’ functional independence.
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INTRODUCTION
In September of 2016, news broke that employees at Wells Fargo had been
moving customer funds into newly created fake accounts—without customer
consent—in order to boost its sales figures.1 For outsiders, the aftermath was
shocking: regulators fined Wells Fargo $3 billion and Wells Fargo fired 5,300
employees.2
But for the board of directors, the now-infamous scandal was more akin to
watching a slow-moving freight train for years. The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency found that the Wells Fargo board had known about fudged sales
numbers for eleven years before the scandal broke.3 And while four directors
resigned in the aftermath of the scandal4 as a result of their lack of oversight, a
central question remained: what had caused the board of a reputable, established,
highly regulated enterprise to overlook a scandal in the making for over a
decade? In other words, investors and regulators alike pondered: “[w]here were
the Independent Directors?”5
Wells Fargo’s board, however, was not alone in its failure to act as an
effective monitor. After software malfunctions tragically caused two Boeing 737
Max aircrafts to nosedive, shareholders and families of crash victims turned to
the board of directors for answers.6 “There is something wrong with the Board,”

1
Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired Over 2 Million Phony Accounts, CNN BUS. (Sept. 9,
2016, 8 :08 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bankfees/index.html.
2
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Wells Fargo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Criminal and
Civil Investigations into Sales Practices Involving the Opening of Millions of Accounts Without Customer
Authorization (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wells-fargo-agrees-pay-3-billion-resolvecriminal-and-civil-investigations-sales-practices; Egan, supra note 1.
3
OFF. OF ENTER. GOVERNANCE & THE OMBUDSMAN, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE SUPERVISION: LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW OF SUPERVISION OF SALES PRACTICES AT
WELLS FARGO 5 (2017) (“Since 2005, the bank’s Board received regular Audit & Security reports indicating the
highest level of EthicsLine internal complaint cases . . . related to sales integrity violations.”); Danielle Ivory,
Wells Fargo’s Regulator Admits It Missed Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2017, at B4.
4
Bradley Keoun, Wells Fargo Directors Exiting After Federal Reserve Slams Governance, THE ST.
(Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/markets/corporate-governance/wells-fargo-directors-retire-afterfederal-reserve-slams-governance-14508322.
5
Priya Cherian Huskins, Naming and Shaming: The Fed Publicly Admonishes Wells Fargo’s Former
Lead Director, WOODRUFF SAWYER (Apr. 24, 2018), https://woodruffsawyer.com/do-notebook/wells-fargodirector/.
6
Douglas MacMillan, For Boeing Board, 737 ‘Safety was Just a Given’, WASH. POST , May 6, 2019, at
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Fortune Magazine declared.7 The list goes on. After the Volkswagen emissions
scandal,8 some noted that the “[p]roblems at Volkswagen [s]tart[ed] in the
[b]oardroom.”9 Following the meteoric rise and catastrophic plummet of bloodtesting startup Theranos, fingers again turned toward the board.10 When the
Equifax data breach commanded headlines in 2017 and prompted a class action
alleging in part that directors were responsible,11 some noted that, “[i]t’s not a
good day to be on the Equifax board.”12
These scandals illustrate the high stakes of the board’s role in corporate and
executive oversight. The board of directors serves on behalf of the shareholders
to ensure that the executive team is acting in the company’s best long-term
interests.13 This now may also include the interests of other constituents,
stakeholders, and society as a whole.14 Within this overarching mandate, one of
the board’s most important roles is to “set up guardrails for the CEO”15—that is,
protect shareholders (and stakeholders) from corporate malfeasance.
Regulators, investors, and courts look toward boards of directors to oversee
and monitor the actions of management and the corporation. 16 Because some

A1.
7
Ellen Florian, Governance Experts on Boeing: ‘There Is Something Wrong with the Board’, FORTUNE
(May 23, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/05/23/boeing-board-governance-experts/.
8
Volkswagen Emission Scandal—Lessons for Investors, Boards, Chief Legal Officers, and Compliance
and Governance Professionals, DIRS. & BDS., https://www.directorsandboards.com/events/volkswagenemission-scandal-lessons-investors-boards-chief-legal-officers-and-compliance-and (last visited Aug. 10,
2022).
9
James B. Stewart, Problems at Volkswagen Start in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/business/international/problems-at-volkswagen-start-in-theboardroom.html.
10
Neil Senturia, Theranos is Cautionary Tale for Board of Directors, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 25,
2019), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/economy/sd-fi-senturia-why-boards-of-directors-needto-know-their-stuff-theranos-20190220-story.html (“[O]ne [story line] is the board of directors and their total
inability to understand the science . . . coupled with their complete unwillingness to confront Holmes with her
deceit and an equal lack of courage to replace her.”).
11
Spencer Mahoney, Boards, Officers Face New Exposure in Data Breaches, CCIG (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://thinkccig.com/data-breach-lawsuits/.
12
Anders Keitz, Equifax Board Faces Scrutiny as Probes Mount Following Cyberattack, THE ST. (Sept.
9, 2017), https://www.thestreet.com/markets/corporate-governance/equifax-board-faces-scrutiny-followingcyberattack-14299086.
13
See MacMillan, supra note 6.
14
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy that Serves All
Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), http://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtableredefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans; Cathy Hwang &
Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE *1, *1 (2020).
15
MacMillan, supra note 6.
16
Faith Stevelman & Sarah C. Haan, Boards in Information Governance, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 179, 182–
83 (2020) (reviewing the prevailing long-standing view of the board as a monitoring board); see Eric J. Pan, A
Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 719 (2009).
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directors are also high-level company employees,17 independent directors—
directors who are not otherwise employed at the company—serve on boards in
increasing numbers and are relied on to prevent self-dealing, scandal, and
mismanagement.18 Indeed, investors, regulators,19 and scholars have focused on
director independence as a key metric,20 theorizing that independent directors
serve as a better check on the managers they are meant to oversee. 21
However, even more recently, investors have started to push boards to not
only maintain a sufficient number of independent directors on their boards, but
also to ensure that the power structure and dynamic in the boardroom is not tilted
in a way that would hinder the ability of the board, as a group, to act
independently of management.22 This push has focused on diluting the structural
power the CEO has in the boardroom.23 That power partly originates from the
power that a CEO holds over directors through her control of information, of
their prospects of renomination, and through her clout and behavioral biases.24
It is also often magnified through the prevalent tradition of having the CEO also
serve as the chair of the board,25 further consolidating boardroom power around
the CEO.
17
Paul H. Zalecki, The Corporate Governance Roles of the Inside and the Outside Directors, 24 U. TOL.
L. REV. 831, 838–39 (1993).
18
Id.
19
The shift toward director independence has been further boosted by regulatory reforms in response to
corporate scandals, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. See Yaron Nili, Out of Sight,
Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 39 (2017)
[hereinafter Out of Sight]; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1472–76, 1539 (2007).
20
Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons
for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 732, 775–77 (2003); David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law
After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 69 (2003). See generally Gordon,
supra note 19 (describing the role of boards of directors in mitigating agency problems); Michelle M. Harner,
Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 583–84 (2010)
(focusing on boards’ broader duties in the context of a controlling shareholder); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (2017)
(requiring boards of widely held companies to have a majority of independent directors); Kahn v. Lynch
Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (stating that “approval of the transaction by an
independent committee of directors or . . . majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden” in fairness review
from the interested party to the challenging party).
21
Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 789 (2011); Rafel
Crespí-Cladera & Bartolomé Pascual-Fuster, Does the Independence of Independent Directors Matter?, 28 J.
CORP. FIN, 116, 116 (2014) (“[M]onitoring activity of the boardroom depends on the effectiveness of the
independent members. This view . . . is in the spirit of regulations . . . , the final corporate governance rules of
the New York Stock Exchange of 2009, and nearly all existing corporate governance codes or guidelines.”).
22
Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors” and the Case for a
Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 26 (2017) [hereinafter Captured Boards].
23
See id.
24
See id. at 26–28.
25
Id. at 40.
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Recognizing the imbalance in power between the management
representative on the board and the independent directors, investors have begun
asking boards to break that power through the introduction of two key
independent leadership roles within the boardroom—an Independent Chair of
the board and a Lead Independent Director (“LID”).26 This Article terms these
emerging leaders as “board gatekeepers.” In the corporate context, the term
“gatekeepers” has developed to reflect the ability of outside professionals, such
as lawyers and auditors, to monitor and curb corporate misconduct.27 The LID
and the Independent Chair are similarly meant to provide this corporate
gatekeeping function within the boardroom, by serving as the “independent
counter-balance to the [CEO]”28 and by signaling, and ensuring, the existence of
proper monitoring of management by the board.29
The push by investors for internal gatekeepers has clearly made an impact.
Today, most companies have either an Independent Chair or LID (or both) on
their boards to bolster investors’ expectations of independence, or at least the
appearance thereof.30 In theory, this dramatic shift in the composition of boards,
and the emergence of board gatekeepers—who provide a second layer of
protection to the independence of the board—should have cemented board
independence in what one can term its functional form: the ability to serve the
crucial gatekeeping role that has been demanded of it.31
However, herein lies the puzzle. Despite the significant rise in the percentage
of independent directors on companies’ boards32 and the emergence of the
independent board gatekeepers—who are meant to “guard the guards”—the
overall ability of boards to effectively monitor management may not have
shifted as much as companies’ self-proclamations suggested and as investors
26
Marion Plouhinec, The Role of the Lead Independent Director, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Nov. 25, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/25/the-role-of-the-lead-independentdirector/ [hereinafter Role of LID].
27
A rich literature in corporate law has addressed the emerging role of accountants, lawyers, and bankers
as gatekeepers. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 917–18, 917
nn.5 & 7 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302, 309 (2004); Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to
Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 365, 368 (2004); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 53, 54–55 (2003); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L .ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 491 (2001); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers,
96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1592–93 (2010) (reviewing the literature on gatekeepers). For a more detailed discussion,
see infra Section I.B.
28
Role of LID, supra note 26.
29
See id.
30
See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B.
31
See Gordon, supra note 19, at 1473; Captured Boards, supra note 22, at 26.
32
See Gordon, supra note 19, at 1473.
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may have assumed. The recent lineup of corporate scandals so vividly illustrates
as much.
Indeed, both the Wells Fargo board and the Boeing board included an LID
who was meant to serve as gatekeeper.33 But, as the Wells Fargo and Boeing
scandals demonstrate, having a designated LID does not necessarily effectuate
true independence.34 In fact, the Federal Reserve has placed direct blame on
Wells Fargo’s LID, stating in a letter to him that “[he] did not appear to lead the
independent directors in pressing firm management for more information and
action, even after [he was] aware of the seriousness of the problems,”35 and that
“[a] lead independent director is appointed to . . . provide an alternative view of,
and (when necessary) check on, executive directors of the board and the
management of the firm. Your performance in that role is an example of
ineffective oversight . . . .”36 Similarly, in the year of the first crash, Boeing faced
a shareholder proposal advocating for an Independent Chair of the board and
alleging that “Boeing shareholders need the enhanced oversight of an
independent board chairman because our Lead Director, Kenneth Duberstein,
had 20-years of long-tenure which can make him a lap dog Lead Director.”37
How can one reconcile the parade of recent scandals—and the ensuing
surprise of regulators and investors—with the emergence of the new board
gatekeepers on which they have relied? This Article is the first to provide a
detailed and critical account of the emergence of board gatekeepers and, in doing
so, it shows that these failures may not be so puzzling once one looks beyond
the mere façade of the boardroom.
Using a first-of-its-kind hand-collected and hand-coded dataset of board
gatekeepers’ independence and powers in 900 publicly traded companies, this
Article shifts the focus to the functional independence of board gatekeepers, and
shows that board gatekeepers’ failures could be explained, at least in part, by
their lack of functional independence. Indeed, in many cases, gatekeepers that
have been purported to be independent are tightly connected to the companies
which they serve in ways that cast doubt on their willingness to truly act

33
WELLS FARGO & C O., PROXY STATEMENT 104 (2011); THE BOEING CO., 2018 ANNUAL MEETING OF
SHAREHOLDERS 12–13 (2018).
34
Abby Adlerman & Kaitlin Quistgaard, Leadership Matters: What Boards Can Learn from the Wells
Fargo Calamity, BOARDSPAN, https://work.boardspan.com/users/0/library/leadership-matters-what-boards-canlearn-from-the-wells-fargo-calamity (last visited May 21, 2022).
35
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Accountability as Lead Independent Director
of
Wells
Fargo
&
Company
Board
of
Directors
(Feb.
2,
2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20180202a3.pdf.
36
Id.
37
THE BOEING CO., supra note 33, at 54.
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independently.
But it is not only the willingness to act that might curtail board gatekeepers’
effectiveness. It is also about the powers at their disposal. Indeed, the sharp
divide between the ceremonial presence of independent gatekeepers and their
functional independence extends beyond concerns regarding their own personal
independence, as manifested in their willingness to act. It also centers around
the lack of concrete tools at their disposal to exert independent monitoring, even
if they so desired. This Article provides the first empirical analysis of the powers
given to LIDs and Independent Chairs of boards, finding that in many cases,
these crucial gatekeepers are granted nothing but a mere title rather than
substantive powers. This second facet of functional independence brings to the
spotlight the concerns regarding gatekeepers’ power to truly act independently
even if they are willing.
The concern regarding explicit powers is further affirmed through a series
of original interviews with directors and general counsels, including LIDs, who
identified the concrete ways through which enumerated gatekeepers’ powers can
affect the board.38 Enumerated powers were seen as particularly important for
preventing discord in the board because they empower the LID to take actions,
even when potential discord may arise, and set clear expectations for both the
board and investors.39
Equally important, the powers given to board gatekeepers are imperative not
only in allowing gatekeepers to exert independence ex ante, but also in providing
a central mechanism of accountability ex post, allowing regulators and investors
to specifically point to a lack of action by these gatekeepers, despite the ability
to do so. This was the case in the Wells Fargo scandal, where regulators pointed
to the LID’s lack of inquiry and lack of demand for additional information
despite the specific powers that were given to the LID in the firm’s Corporate
Governance Guidelines.40
Finally, it also does not help that board gatekeepers are predominantly white
men, and that gender and racially diverse directors are shunned from these
leadership roles in many companies.41 Out of the 900 companies sampled, only

38

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part II.
40
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., supra note 35.
41
DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF
WOMEN
AND
MINORITIES
ON
FORTUNE
500
B OARDS
6–7
(6th
ed.
2021),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/center-for-board-effectiveness/missing-piecesfortune-500-board-diversity-study-6th-edition-report.pdf. According to a study conducted by the Alliance of
Board Diversity and the consulting firm Deloitte, in 2020, 82.6% of Fortune 500 directors were white and 61.7%
39

2022]

BOARD GATEKEEPERS

99

six companies had a female serving as Independent Chair and only 6% of all
LIDs included within this analysis were female.42 Recent studies have shown
that more diverse boards generally make better decisions and are more apt to
prevent misconduct.43 This lack of diversity may further hinder gatekeepers’
functional independence.
Recognizing the gap between board gatekeepers’ ceremonial and functional
independence, this Article proceeds to argue that the blind championing of board
gatekeepers by investors and companies alike may not only undermine the
credibility of director independence, but may also render it counterproductive
altogether. Therefore, this Article posits it is important to safeguard gatekeepers’
functional independence through a combination of heightened independence
standards, improved disclosures, and the grant of specific and common
enumerated powers.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides information on the current
structure and importance of the board of directors, including the increased focus
on board independence. It also highlights the gatekeeping function of boards and
the emergence of board gatekeepers as a means to ensure it. Part II provides an
empirical analysis of board gatekeepers’ independence by using hand-collected
data of all S&P 500 companies, as well as a random sample of 200 mid-cap S&P
600 companies and 200 small-cap Russell 3000 companies. The data reveals
significant concerns regarding the personal independence of gatekeepers as well
as their power to exert independent monitoring. Part II also provides qualitative
data on the importance of gatekeepers through original interviews with directors
and general counsels, including LIDs. Finally, Part III explores the ramifications
of the current reliance on board gatekeepers in name only, and concludes by
exploring several modifications to restore the integrity of that “independence”
title.

were white males. Id. at 17. In fact, 87% of Fortune 500 companies have a board chair who is a white male and,
of the companies that have an LID, 77.1% are white males. Id. at 26.
42
See discussion infra Part II; see also Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity
in Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145, 171 (2019) (showing that only 9.6% of LIDs were women in 2015) [hereinafter
Beyond the Numbers].
43
See Beyond the Numbers, supra note 42, at 160, 162–63; Laura Casares Field, Matthew E. Souther &
Adam S. Yore, At the Table but Can Not Break Through the Glass Ceiling: Board Leadership Positions Elude
Diverse Directors, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 787, 805–07 (2020); Aida Sijamic Wahid, The Effects and the Mechanisms
of Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from Financial Manipulation, 159 J. BUS. ETHICS 705, 721–22 (2019)
(suggesting that firms with more female board members engage in less financial misconduct); Christopher
Fredette & Ruth Sessler Bernstein, Ethno-Racial Diversity on Nonprofit Boards: A Critical Mass Perspective,
48 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q., 931, 936–38 (2019) (finding that boards with a critical mass of
racially diverse board members have better corporate governance).
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DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE BOARD

Understanding the increasing importance of the board—a principal
institution within both corporations and society—as the key corporate institution
provides a helpful backdrop against which to understand the emerging roles of
Independent Chairs and LIDs as internal gatekeepers within the board. Modernday boards are not only tasked with guiding the company’s key decisions or
mentoring management, but are also being increasingly asked to provide a check
on management, ensuring the integrity of management’s decisions for the
benefit of shareholders and stakeholders alike.44
Thus, as boards’ monitoring functions become increasingly important, so too
do the mechanisms through which investors and companies seek to fulfill and
enhance these roles. This section outlines the role of the board of directors; the
increasing importance that regulators, courts, and investors have placed on board
independence as a key pillar of its gatekeeping role; and the current structure
and mechanisms that have emerged to ensure its independence.
A. The Role of the Board of Directors
Corporations exist at the heart of society—acting as a hub around which
most economic and social activity centers—and the board of directors has
remained at the heart of these corporations for centuries.45 This is especially true
of America, where corporate boards can be traced directly back to the country’s
founding fathers.46 Today, corporations represent a convergence of social and
political spheres that reach far beyond the commercial world.47 Corporations are
actively shaping issues such as immigration reform, environmental policies, gun
regulation, racial justice, gender equality, and religious freedoms.48 As
companies continue to grow in size and scope of impact, boards of directors are
uniquely situated to impact both their respective companies and society at
large.49

44

Alces, supra note 21, at 789–90; Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 269

(1997).
45
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation:
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 375–76 (1975) (discussing the origins of the board
of directors as the core of modern corporate decision-making).
46
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, OUTSOURCING THE BOARD: HOW BOARD
SERVICE PROVIDERS CAN IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17 (2018) [hereinafter OUTSOURCING THE
BOARD].
47
Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1558 (2018).
48
See id. at 1535, 1537–58, 1561.
49
See Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1188–90 (2020) [hereinafter
Horizontal Directors] (discussing the increased reliance on boards).

2022]

BOARD GATEKEEPERS

101

Over half of Americans are directly invested in corporations through the
stock market, and just over four in ten Americans have retirement investments
through employer- or union-sponsored programs.50 Large corporations,
however, affect the lives of more than just shareholders. Exxon, for example,
has operations in almost every country and annual sales close to that of Sweden’s
gross domestic product.51 Walmart “supports an employee/family community of
eight to ten million, which is about the size of Austria, Switzerland, or Israel,
and larger than a hundred other countries.”52 At the core of these organizations
sits the board of directors, meant to manage, monitor, and guide the
corporation.53 The impact of corporate success or failure is felt by shareholders,
stakeholders, and society at large.
In recent years, individual directors and the boards on which they serve have
begun to take on increasingly important roles within the corporate governance
framework.54 While corporate boards originated to serve mostly as an advisory
role, boards today are tasked with much more, including monitoring company
management.55 In fact, the board of directors was one of the first solutions to
address the agency problems that arose under corporations’ dispersed ownership
structure, whereby diffused ownership led to increased power at the hand of
management.56 The board was therefore tasked with monitoring management to
ensure the company was run in the best interest of its shareholders. Ultimately,
the board’s role is to curtail management’s ability to extract private benefits57 or
act in a suboptimal way with respect to shareholder interests. 58
In addition to this monitoring role, the board must also be an active
participant in the company’s key managerial decisions, including mergers, stock
issuances, changes of company governance documents, and the hiring of the

50
Kim Parker & Richard Fry, More than Half of U.S. Households Have Some Investment in the Stock
Market, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/25/more-than-halfof-u-s-households-have-some-investment-in-the-stock-market/.
51
Lin, supra note 47, at 1559–60.
52
DAVID ROTHKOPF, POWER, INC.: THE EPIC RIVALRY BETWEEN BIG BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT—
AND THE RECKONING T HAT LIES AHEAD 310 (2013).
53
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2016) (AM. BAR ASS’N); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006).
54
See Out of Sight, supra note 19, at 39 (discussing the importance of directors); Gregory H. Shill, The
Independent Board as Shield, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1811, 1824 (2020).
55
See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 139–41
(1976) (discussing the practices of the corporate board); Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, BoardsR-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2014) (“[S]tate law requires boards
to mediate the relations between ownership and control of the corporation.”); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound:
The Twentieth Century Evolution of Directors’ Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 63, 136–38 (2009).
56
See generally Gordon, supra note 19, at 1468.
57
See Alces, supra note 21, at 789.
58
See Harner, supra note 20, at 583–84.
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management team.59 Delaware courts have continuously reiterated the
importance of the director’s management role, noting that “directors, not
shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage the firm.” 60 Delaware’s key
business judgment rule helps to further ingrain this role by creating a
“presumption of deference to the board’s authority as the corporation’s central
and final decision maker.”61
Recently, boards have also been increasingly pushed to engage and protect
the interests of other stakeholders. In 2019, Business Roundtable released a
statement acknowledging stakeholders’ interests.62 Johnson & Johnson’s
Chairman and CEO similarly reflected that corporations can and should play an
essential role in improving society when it is “committed to meeting the needs
of all stakeholders.”63 Growing support for stakeholder interests is prevalent
among institutional investors as well. For example, Larry Fink, the CEO of
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, issued a letter to all CEOs urging
them to be “committed to embracing purpose and serving all stakeholders.”64
Perhaps realizing the push to prioritize stakeholder interests, board advisors
considered key stakeholder demands, interests, and preferences a top priority for
boards in 2020.65
Finally, alongside its monitoring and managing roles, the board also serves
as an important resource to management by providing insight, advice, and
networking benefits that afford the company channels through which to access
resources.66 Within this role, the board, particularly the independent board
members, is able to provide strategic guidance and bring a more objective,

59
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 45 (2012). To
this end, boards are largely expected to coordinate succession planning long before the current CEO ever steps
down. See OUTSOURCING THE BOARD, supra note 46, at 35.
60
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670 & 10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *30 (Del.
Ch. July 14, 1989); accord In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 54 (Del. Ch. 2013); Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); TW Servs. Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., No.
Civ. A. 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *9–10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); Shill, supra note 54, at 1874–75.
61
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L.
769, 787 (2006).
62
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy that Serves All
Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtableredefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
63
Id.
64
Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 16,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/16/a-fundamental-reshaping-of-finance/.
65
Steve Klemash, Rani Doyle & Jamie C. Smith, Eight Priorities for Boards in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 14, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/14/eight-priorities-forboards-in-2020.
66
Out of Sight, supra note 19, at 43.
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experienced perspective compared to corporate insiders on a range of issues. 67
B. The Push for Director Independence
Given corporate boards’ increasing importance, many companies are
rethinking and revising the composition of their boards in response to heightened
public and regulatory attention. To ensure that boards effectively carry out their
monitoring function, shareholders,68 regulators, exchanges,69 and courts70 have
come to expect that boards are designated as independent from the management
they are meant to supervise, lauding independence as the best way to achieve
effective monitoring and curb agency costs created by dispersed ownership and
managerial power.71
Indeed, while some have contested the need or value of independent
boards,72 investors and regulators enthusiastically clamor for it. Shareholders
have been looking for board members who can effectively scrutinize
management and object to management decisions when necessary73—and
shareholders perceive an independent director as the best qualified to do so. 74
As a result of this push toward independence, the CEO has often become the
lone insider in most boardrooms.75 It is not surprising, therefore, that board
composition and independence, with an emphasis on director tenure and board
leadership, have been key issues for both investors and the ever-influential76

67
Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Puzzles About Corporate Boards and Board Diversity, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 841, 844 (2011); see Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next
Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 884 (2018).
68
See Gordon, supra note 19, at 1540.
69
Id. at 1468.
70
Id.
71
Alces, supra note 21, at 789–90; see also Captured Boards, supra note 22, at 22.
72
Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC.
REG. L.J. 370 (2002); Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Too Much Independence on the Board, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2013, 10:42 AM), https://archive.nytimes.com/dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/the-caseagainst-too-much-independence-on-the-board/; Robert C. Pozen, The Big Idea: The Case for Professional
Boards, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/12/the-big-idea-the-case-for-professional-boards;
Olubunmi Faleye, The Downside to Full Board Independence, 58 MITSLOAN MGMT. REV. 87, 87–88 (2016).
73
See S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Independent Directors Curb Financial
Fraud? The Evidence and Proposals for Further Reform, 93 IND. L.J. 757, 780 (2018).
74
See Yaron Nili, Successor CEOs, 99 B.U. L. REV. 787, 798–99 (2019) [hereinafter Successor CEOs].
75
See Captured Boards, supra note 22, at 22.
76
George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1290–91 (2014).
Proxy advisors dramatically changed proxy voting by solving the collective action problem. Id. at 1288.
Institutional investors typically follow the advice of proxy advisor services, increasing votes against
management. Id. at 1289. As a result, corporate executives have been lobbying Congress and the SEC to regulate
proxy advisors. Id. at 1289–90; see also Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, Competing for Votes, 10 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 287, 317 (2020); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005) (“[P]owerful CEOs come on the bended
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proxy advisory firms in recent years.77 For instance, proxy advisory firm Glass
Lewis outlines in its policy guidelines that a board “can best protect and enhance
the interests of shareholders if it is sufficiently independent.”78 Both ISS and
Glass Lewis also recommend an Independent Chair or other independent
leadership position.79 Institutional investors have also focused on independent
leadership, often supporting calls for independent board chairs and voting
against directors when they deem the directors to lack independence. 80
Regulators and courts have also embraced these shifts, and, in some
instances, have added new requirements for bolstering independence.
Specifically, following the collapses of Enron and WorldCom, private and
public regulatory players took strong action to ensure boards were held
accountable for monitoring management.81 The federal government began by
overhauling the regulatory requirements for public corporations with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”).82 These regulatory requirements were
knee to Rockville, Maryland, where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views
. . . .”); Asaf Eckstein & Sharon Hannes, A Long/Short Incentive Scheme for Proxy Advisory Firms, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 787, 795–801 (2018) (describing the increasing power of proxy advisors).
77
Ann Yerger, Four Takeaways from Proxy Season 2016, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July
14, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/14/four-takeaways-from-proxy-season-2016/; David A.
Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Director Tenure Remains a Focus of Investors and Activists, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/01/director-tenure-remains-afocus-of-investors-and-activists.
78
GLASS LEWIS, 2020 PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO
PROXY ADVICE 3 (2020), https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Guidelines_US.pdf.
79
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: BENCHMARK POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (2021), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-VotingGuidelines.pdf; GLASS LEWIS, 2021 PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES 7–8 (2021), https://www.glasslewis.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/US-Voting-Guidelines-GL.pdf.
80
STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF STAN. BUS., RR DONNELLY, EQUILAR & STAN. UNIV. ROCK CTR. FOR CORP.
GOVERNANCE, 2015 INVESTOR SURVEY: DECONSTRUCTING PROXY STATEMENTS—WHAT MATTERS TO
INVESTORS 1, 8 (2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/cgri-survyey-2015deconstructing-proxy-statements_0.pdf (noting that 62% of leading institutional investors indicated they read
the director independence section of the proxy statement and relied on it to make voting decisions; this was the
second-most read section after the pay for performance section (64%)); Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”:
Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 108 (2016) [hereinafter New Insiders]; Nikitha
Sattiraju, Director Accountability a Top Priority for BlackRock, THE DEAL (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.thedeal.com/activism/director-accountability-a-top-priority-for-blackrock (noting that BlackRock
recently indicated that holding board members accountable can be an effective tool to impact corporate
responsibility). In 2019, the firm voted against 5,000 directors due to issues such as lack of independence.
Sattiraju, supra.
81
See Gordon, supra note 19, at 1535–36.
82
See New Insiders, supra note 80, at 150. Shareholder proposals for an independent board chair regularly
receive strong shareholder support, which suggests that independence remains an important concern for
corporate shareholders; for example, in 2020 (2021) shareholder proposals for an independent board chair
received 35% (32%) support on average. MARC TREVIÑO, MELISSA SAWYER & JUNE HU, SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL
LLP,
LESSONS
FROM
THE
2021
PROXY
SEASON
13
(2021),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/Lessons-from-the-2021-Proxy-Season.pdf.
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subsequently strengthened with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).83 Motivated by the
belief that company employees (often termed as insiders) and those with
significant ties to the company are less capable of effectively monitoring
corporate officers, and that independent directors are better equipped to detect
fraud, protect shareholders’ interests, and monitor managerial abuse of
authority, these regulatory reforms forced the U.S. exchanges to revamp their
director independence requirements.84 Consequently, the NYSE and NASDAQ
have also imposed listing standards that require firms to populate their boards
and committees with independent directors.85 However, the board has
considerable discretion when classifying directors as “independent,” making its
gatekeeping role, at least when it comes to determining independence, selffulfilling.86
State laws also require director independence in specific situations, such as
approval of interested transactions, derivative suits, and litigation committees. 87
Recognizing the importance of the board in any corporate decision, Delaware
law places a large emphasis on independent directors in deciding how to evaluate
challenged board decisions. Specifically, Delaware courts require that
independent directors approve any related party transactions in order for the less

83

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
See Gordon, supra note 19, at 1540; see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking
Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of the Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 866 (2010).
85
For example, SOX mandated the creation of an audit committee of the board that has greater powers
and many more responsibilities than ever before, such as working with external auditors of internal controls. See
COVINGTON & B URLING LLP, CONSIDERING DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE 5 (2007) (copy on file with the Emory
Law Journal). The NYSE and NASDAQ requirements largely track those of the SEC Item 407 of Regulation SK. See Horizontal Directors, supra note 49, at 1206–07, 1207 n.160. This mandate requires companies to
identify each director or nominee that the company considers independent. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a) (2012).
Companies usually satisfy the Item 407 requirements by including the disclosures within their annual proxy
statement or annual 10-K. Companies must also disclose individual independence standards, as well as each
director that is a member of the compensation, nominating, or audit committee that is not independent. Id.;
N.Y.S.E. Manual (CCH), § 303A.01, 303A.04-06; NASDAQ Stock Mkt. Rules (CCH) 5605(b)(1), 5605(c)(2),
5605(d)(2), & 5605(e); see also Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169,
2187 (2004) (“The revised listing standards of both the NYSE [New York Stock Exchange] and NASDAQ . . .
require (with a few exceptions) that listed-company boards have a majority of independent directors . . . .”).
86
The guidelines mandate that a director is not independent if the director has a material relationship with
the company, but the board retains the power to determine whether a material relationship exists. Out of Sight,
supra note 19, at 40. A nice illustration is the case of Penny Pritzker—one of America’s richest and most
powerful businesswomen—who was an independent director of Hyatt Hotels until her status changed. See John
R. Emshwiller & Alexandra Berzon, Hyatt Director Gets a Status Makeover, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703649004575437713243128; Gary Larkin, Just What is an
Independent Director Anyway?, THE CONF. BD. (Sept. 10, 2010), https://www.conferenceboard.org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=5649 (offering a more detailed critique).
87
See New Insiders, supra note 80, at 115.
84
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stringent business judgment rule to apply.88 Delaware courts thus pay special
attention to the independence of each director the board claims as independent,
engaging in a fact-driven analysis.
C. Compliance and the Board
One of the growing areas of board focus is corporate compliance, so much
so that one scholar noted “compliance is the new corporate governance.” 89
Increasingly, regulators and courts turn to the board as a key institution tasked
with ensuring corporate compliance.90 Each individual director maintains a
fiduciary duty to the company they serve. Part of fulfilling that fiduciary duty
involves ensuring that management has an effective corporate compliance
program in place and staying informed of and overseeing the compliance
program.91
In order to avoid prosecution when challenged, compliance programs must
be well designed, applied earnestly and in good faith, and must work in
practice.92 For example, the Supreme Court of Delaware recently upheld a
Caremark claim93 against the board of ice cream manufacturer, Blue Bell
Creameries, after listeria-infected ice cream led to consumer injury and death.94
The court refused to dismiss a plaintiff’s bad faith claim against the board of
directors, as the complaint contended the board “utterly failed to adopt or
implement any reporting and compliance systems,”95 which breached the
board’s duties under Caremark and Stone v. Ritter to exercise oversight and “to
monitor the corporation’s operation viability, legal compliance, and financial

88
See In re Caremark Intl’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Nicolle Stracar,
Applying a New Regulatory Framework to Interested Transactions by Minority Shareholders, 20 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 993, 993–94 (2018).
89
Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2075
(2016).
90
In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959; Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364
(Del. 2006).
91
Robert Biskup, Krista Parsons & Robert Lamm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 15,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/15/board-oversight-of-corporate-compliance-is-it-time-for-arefresh/#1b.
92
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: CRIM. DIV., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download.
93
Caremark derivative claims allege directors knew or should have known that the company was
violating the law, and that the board of directors failed to take good faith efforts to prevent or remedy the situation
to the ultimate detriment of the shareholders. See In re Caremark., 698 A.2d at 961; Roy Shapira, A New
Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1857, 1857 (2021) (discussing the role
corporate law plays in holding directors accountable for compliance failures).
94
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 805 (Del. 2019).
95
Id. at 808 (quoting Marchand v. Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159, at *16 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 27, 2018)).
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performance.”96 The decision came just a few months after Wells Fargo issued
one of the largest shareholder derivative lawsuit settlements in history, paying
shareholders $320 million in value, with $240 million in cash.97 In large part,
the Wells Fargo settlement came as a result of the directors’ failure to ensure
corporate compliance with applicable laws after the company’s infamous fake
accounts scandal.98
These cases help articulate the board’s importance to corporate compliance
and risk oversight generally. Not only must the board help install compliance
programs, but the board must also remain meaningfully engaged throughout by
approving key policies and procedures.99 To do so, the board must stay
knowledgeable about the company’s compliance programs as well as the
industry standards.100 This risk oversight role plays an important part in
corporate governance today, effectively situating the board to play a pivotal role
in companies and society at large.101
D. The Emergence of Gatekeepers in the Boardroom
Given boards’ increasing importance within corporations and the proceeding
push for independence in the boardroom, two specific leadership positions have
emerged to serve as guardians of independence within the boardroom: the
Independent Board Chair and the LID.102 In all companies, the chair remains the
key leader in the boardroom. Traditionally, many companies had their CEO also
serve as chair, therefore consolidating the power dynamic of the board around
the CEO. However, recent years have seen a push for chair independence to
ensure more effective independent monitoring of management, including the
CEO herself.103 Where the chair is not the CEO, her role is to both monitor and
advise the company’s management team while leading the board. 104 Alongside
96

Id. at 809.
Kevin M. LaCroix, Massive Settlement in Wells Fargo Bogus Account Scandal Derivative Suit, THE
D&O DIARY (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/03/articles/shareholders-derivativelitigation/massive-settlement-in-wells-fargo-bogus-account-scandal-derivative-suit/; In re Wells Fargo & Co.
S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1074–75 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
98
In re Wells Fargo, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1087.
99
Daniel R. Roach, The Board of Directors’ Role in Compliance and Ethics, J. HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE 53, 54 (2007).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 53.
102
See Subodh Mishra, 2019 ISS Global Policy Survey Results, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Sept. 25, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/25/2019-iss-global-policy-survey-results/ (noting
that the most common type of governance proposal submitted for consideration in 2019 was the request to have
the board chair be an independent director).
103
Independent Board Leadership, COUNCIL OF I NSTITUTIONAL I NV’S. (Feb. 24, 2014),
https://www.cii.org/independent_board.
104
Ryan Krause, Being the CEO’s Boss: An Examination of Board Chair Orientations, 38 STRAT. MGMT.
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the push for separating the roles of chair and CEO, a parallel trend has led to the
emergence of an LID, especially for companies who lack an Independent Chair.
When implemented, an LID plays a dual and overlapping role in corporate
governance, acting as an intermediary between company leadership and
independent directors.105
To understand the backdrop against which board gatekeepers emerged, it is
first important to understand why boards that are comprised with mostly
independent directors needed a gatekeeping reinforcement.
1. The Limitations of Independent Boards
While the move of boards toward independence was an important
development, it was not without its limitations. Below is an overview of some
of the key concerns with the independent board and the emergence of board
gatekeepers as a partial attempt to counter these limitations.
a. Functional Versus Designatory
While most boards are comprised almost solely of directors designated as
independent, there are good reasons to doubt their ability to truly exert
independence from management in their board work. The ability to act
independently is what this Article terms as directors’ functional independence.
Despite the heightened focus on director independence, the current approach
to director independence—one that is focused on a set of rudimentary
prerequisites and subsequent certification by the board of directors—is, as many
have highlighted, a flawed approach.106 It leaves too much discretion at the
hands of companies in designating directors as independent; even when there
are close social and financial ties that may cast doubt on such designation, the
consideration and information before the board is rarely disclosed to investors
J. 697, 697 (2017) [hereinafter Being the CEO’s Boss].
105
Role of LID, supra note 26.
106
See Out of Sight, supra note 19, at 37–38; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J.
CORP. L. 447, 461–63 (2008); Theo Francis & Joann S. Lublin, Boards Get More Independent, but Ties Endure,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boards-get-more-independent-but-ties-endure1453234607 (highlighting many prominent examples of directors that technically qualify as independent, yet
fail to satisfy the true spirit of independent leadership given enduring ties to the company and its leaders); Julian
Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 870 (“The theory of
structural bias merely recognizes the limits of director independence. When a conflict arises, it may be possible
to find directors . . . disinterested from a financial perspective (although the implicit conspiracy theory suggests
otherwise), but it is virtually impossible for directors to be unconflicted in all meaningful respects.”); S. Burcu
Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Elusive Monitoring Function of Independent Directors, 21 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 235, 235 (2018) (finding that requiring the existence of independent board members on a board
has not resulted in more effective monitoring, but rather created the illusion of it).
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and, in practice, violations are not enforced. Moreover, after directors join the
board, even if they are as independent as they come, there are strong forces that
gradually erode their independence.
First, director interlocks, especially among companies within the same
industry, call into question the true ability of many directors to independently
monitor management and act in the best interests of shareholders. Many
directors have become full-time directors, splitting their time between multiple
companies because of the appeal of director positions.107 Because management
controls the nomination process, directors who seek to maintain board positions
may be less likely to alienate management for fear of losing their position.108
This means that despite the company designating them as independent, they may
rely entirely upon management to maintain their source of income, which raises
questions as to whether they truly fulfill the duties of an independent director.
Second, as directors serve on the company board, there is a heightened risk
of a director cultivating social ties, human capital, and reputational concerns,
which may ultimately lessen the impetus to act independently or to hold inside
directors and management accountable.109 Furthermore, longer director tenure
often correlates with increased equity in the company, 110 thereby putting
independent directors’ willingness to act independently at risk if, by doing so,
this equity could be damaged, as may often be the case.111
b. Board Structure
The design of corporate boards in the modern corporate governance
ecosystem leads to an additional structural limitation which may significantly
hinder the functional independence of directors: the board’s “information
capture.”112 This “information capture” is characterized by the need for
directors’ access to information in order to perform their roles.113
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Aida Sijamic Wahid & Kyle T. Welch, Does the Market Value Professional Directors?, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/26/does-the-market-valueprofessional-directors/.
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See Horizontal Directors, supra note 49, at 1232.
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See New Insiders, supra note 80, at 132; Gordon, supra note 19, at 1473.
110
See Steve Pakela & John Sinkular, Trends in Board of Director Compensation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 13, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/04/13/trends-inboardof-directorcompensation/.
111
See Horizontal Directors, supra note 49, at 1234–35; New Insiders, supra note 80, at 121.
112
See Captured Boards, supra note 22, at 24; Ronald J. Gilson & Jeff N. Gordon, Board 3.0: An
Introduction, 74 BUS. LAW. 351, 351 (2019); Ann C. Mul. . . & Charles M. Elson, A New Kind of Captured
Board, DIRS. & BDS. (2014), https://www.directorsandboards.com/articles/singlenew-kind-captured-board.
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strategic information they received than their nonindependent counterparts.” Robert J. Thomas, Joshua B. Bellin
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Indeed, despite the growing push for independent directors, boards very
much still depend on management for information,114 and often are likely to
overly rely on and defer to the CEO in their work. This is not surprising
considering boards still depend on management for reelection, only meet a
handful of times a year, and directors lack independent access to information or
company resources.115
2. Board Leadership as Gatekeeping
The term “gatekeeping” is often ascribed to the many third parties tasked
with preventing a corporation from wrongdoing.116 A gatekeeper has been
defined as one who (1) acts as a reputational intermediary; (2) is in place to
prevent wrongdoing; and (3) is susceptible to significant reputational capital
depreciation or depletion if found to have condoned wrongdoing.117 Traditional
gatekeepers fulfill two roles: ensure financial compliance and monitor the
corporation.118
Conventionally, external gatekeepers have been thought to fulfill these roles.
External gatekeepers include external auditors, analysts, and credit rating
agencies.119 While these gatekeepers are meant to be effective in detecting and
exposing types of financial misreporting, accounting fraud, or other questionable
decisions, such as those that lead to the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, 120
their effectiveness is limited. Specifically, these gatekeepers rely on
management for their employment, as management retains the power to hire and
fire them.121 This creates an inherent conflict: auditors are hired by the
management they audit, lawyers are paid by the firms that use them, etc.122
Given the inherent issues with external gatekeepers, investors and regulators
& George Marcotte, How Boards Can Be Better—A Manifesto, MITSLOAN MGMT. REV. (Jan. 7, 2009),
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Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2019, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec.
14, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/14/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2019/.
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have increasingly turned toward the board to fulfill an internal gatekeeping
function.123 Specifically, they have turned toward independent board members
in leadership positions. Because of their lack of insider status or perceived ties
to management, these independent directors in key leadership roles are thought
to be capable of impartially assessing the actions and decisions of the company
and its management, as well as guard and ensure the independence of the board,
as a whole, from within.124 Additionally, these directors are largely viewed as
sensitive to reputational concerns,125 which is a key pillar of effective
gatekeepers.126 With this trend, two key roles have emerged to lead and guide
the independent directors and strengthen the board’s independent decision
making: the LID and the Independent Chair.
3. The Rise of the Independent Chair
As noted, historically, the role of chair was often given to the CEO because
it was believed that the executive under such a structure would possess multiple
perspectives as well as the power to quickly enact corporate initiatives.127 Today,
however, most large public companies have separated the roles of CEO and
chair, and many have chosen to nominate an independent director as the chair.
The underlying rationale for separating the two roles and replacing the CEOchair with an independent board member is that the board must be able to
monitor management properly and effectively. When the head of management
is also the head of the board, this becomes less likely given the clout the CEO
has on both management and the board.
As the leader of the board, the chair’s role cannot be understated, and an
independent leader “curbs conflicts of interest, promotes oversight of risk,
manages the relationship between the board and CEO, serves as a conduit for
regular communication with shareowners, and is a logical next step in the
123
Theoretically, the services of gatekeepers can be performed from within or outside the corporation.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV.
869, 905 (1990) (discussing in-house lawyers as internal gatekeepers); Tuch, supra note 27, at 1592–93.
124
Avci, Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 106, at 239.
125
See, e.g., Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder
Wealth, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 307 (2007) (finding that following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors
experience a significant decline in other board seats held); Martin Bugeja, Raymond Da Silva Rosa & Andrew
Lee, The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm
Directors, 36 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 185, 208 (2009) (finding a reputation effect for directors in the context of
takeovers).
126
Tuch, supra note 27, at 1594–96 (discussing the importance of reputational function to gatekeepers);
COFFEE, supra note 117, at 3 (2006) (“Central to this model is the concept of reputational capital.”).
127
Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel & Xiaohui Liu, CEO and Board Chair Roles: To Split or Not to Split?, 17
J. CORP. FIN 1595, 1595 (2011) (“Historically, an overwhelming majority of U.S. firms have chosen to combine
the role of CEO and chairman of the board.”).
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development of an independent board.”128 Because the chair leads the board and
board meetings, the chair maintains significant prestige among her board,
allowing her to exert influence during board deliberations and prior to important
votes.129
The board chair serves a critical role not only on the board, but also within
the overall function of the corporation. The board chair acts as an asset to the
CEO and management, while also monitoring and evaluating the CEO’s
performance. The chair typically provides leadership on the board, ensures the
board fulfills its duties, schedules meetings, organizes the agenda for meetings,
ensures proper flow of information to the board, oversees the proxy materials’
preparation and distribution, acts as a liaison between the board and
management, and represents the company to external groups.130
For example, in a letter to Wells Fargo’s chair, the Federal Reserve Board
wrote:
As Chair, it was your responsibility to lead the WFC board in its
oversight of the firm’s business and operations. With respect to that
responsibility, it was incumbent upon you as leader of the WFC board
to ensure that the business strategies approved by the board were
consistent with the risk management capabilities of the firm. It was
also incumbent on you to ensure that the WFC board had sufficient
information to carry out its responsibilities.131

Additionally, when asked about the difference between her roles as CEO of
Hewlett-Packard, Inc. and board chair of Hewlett-Packard Enterprise when
Hewlett-Packard split in 2015, Margaret Whitman responded, “[t]he chairman
[role] is to help the board be productive, help the CEO be successful.” 132 When
Walgreens chose to separate the role of CEO and chair, it explained in its proxy
statement that the separation allowed the chair to “focus on leadership of the
128
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supra note 103.
129
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emerged as a possible alternative to splitting the CEO and chairman positions in many corporations.”).
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Board of Directors, including . . . serving as a liaison and supplemental channel
of communication between independent directors and the Chief Executive
Officer, and serving as a sounding board and advisor to the Chief Executive
Officer.”133 In its 2020 proxy statement, Intel noted that maintaining an
Independent Chair helps better fulfill the role of the chair, including “helping to
facilitate relations between the Board, the CEO, and other senior management,
assist the Board in reaching consensus on particular strategies and policies, and
foster robust evaluation processes, and by efficiently allocating oversight
responsibilities between the independent directors and management.”134
While traditionally one individual held the role of both CEO and chair of
any given corporation, Independent Chairs rose to popularity quickly. In fact,
the vast majority of U.S. corporations had a dual CEO-chair position as late as
the end of the financial crisis,135 and only recently have investors placed
heightened pressure on firms to separate the positions and install an Independent
Chair.136 Soon after the financial crisis, calls for independent leadership rang out
as a supposed antidote for what was viewed largely as a failure to engage in
effective corporate oversight—even by those boards comprised of independent
directors.137 Members in both houses of Congress introduced bills mandating
independent board chairs,138 and Congress introduced several proposals calling
for mandatory separation of the CEO and chair functions. 139 Though such
proposals were unsuccessful in Congress, the SEC began to require companies
to disclose “(a) whether and why the company has chosen to combine or separate

133
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the principal executive officer and board chair positions, and (b) why the
company believed that its leadership structure is the most appropriate.”140
Investors also saw the implementation of an Independent Chair as a solution
to many of their corporate governance concerns. The Council for Institutional
Investors’ governance policies, for instance, advocate that “board[s] should be
chaired by an independent director” in order to provide the clearest separation
of power between management and the board.141 Proxy advisory firm Glass
Lewis also advocates for Independent Chairs, noting that Independent Chairs are
more likely to set pro-shareholder agendas and lead proactive and effective
boards.142 BlackRock also favors an Independent Chair, but considers
implementation of an LID as an appropriate alternative.143
These overarching policies are supported by the continuing prevalence of
shareholder proposals advocating for either separation of the chair and CEO role
or implementation of an Independent Chair. In 2020, forty-four companies in
the S&P 500 voted on shareholder proposals requesting a separate CEO and
chair or Independent Chair.144 The number of proposals presented on this topic
increased by 12% and 23% in 2018 and 2019, respectively, compared to prior
years.145 For instance, in 2017, thirty-eight companies in the Equilar 500 faced
shareholder proposals requesting an Independent Chair.146 Companies that do
not implement independent or separate chairs as a response to these proposals
often face a similar proposal the next year, signifying shareholders’ dedication
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to independent leadership.147 Walmart, for example, faced similar proposals
each year for the five years prior.148 In 2020, shareholders at Boeing offered a
majority support in favor of splitting the CEO and chair role, with the support of
top institutional investor, Vanguard Group, using the vote as a way to signal
dissatisfaction with corporate leadership in recent years.149
In response to this pressure, whether as a result of shareholder proposals or
voluntary adoption of what is widely considered best practice, in 2019, the
majority of S&P 500 boards had split chair and CEO positions, compared with
only 40% a decade ago.150 Moreover, as of 2019, 34% of S&P 1500 boards have
an Independent Chair, more than double the mere 16% in 2009.151
4. The Rise of the LID
In tandem with the rise of the Independent Chair role, the Lead Independent
Director role has also risen in popularity, since an increasing number of firms
have “electe[d] to designate a lead independent director and have tailored the
position’s responsibilities to the unique needs of the firm.”152 Today, nearly 58%
of S&P 500 companies have appointed an LID,153 and the vast majority of
companies that have resisted implementing an Independent Chair have, at the
very least, instituted the position of an LID.154
In contrast with the board chair, who fulfills a similar purpose on each board,
LIDs are not officially mandated or required on any board regardless of the
board’s structure. This means that companies may also more freely choose
which powers to grant LIDs and how strong to make these powers when they do
choose to implement an LID. The powers allocated to an LID, as well as any
requirements, restrictions, or qualifications, are often included within a
147
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company’s corporate governance guidelines.155 These documents are a more
detailed extension of the bylaws: they elaborate on the issues involving board
composition and process, committee assignments and responsibilities, and other
important governance details.156 Companies treat these documents extremely
seriously, putting intentional effort into drafting and revising them over time.157
Regulators have used these guidelines when assessing directors’ failures.158
Similarly, shareholders value these guidelines for the details that they provide
around the roles and responsibilities of the board and the governance roadmap
they create for the company.159
The LID plays an important role between and among many key players in
the corporate governance area. Among other things, the LID is expected to help
ensure that the board appropriately monitors the CEO, evaluate and support the
chair, act as a point of contact for stakeholders and shareholders, and serve as an
alternative communication channel and mediator for nonexecutive directors.160
When the corporation is operating smoothly, the LID is a versatile contributor
to good relationships and the functioning of the board, but the LID is also
expected to assist in resolution facilitation in times of stress. 161 The LID also
plays an important role in leading the search for a new chair when the current
chair steps down.162
When given the proper powers and tools to lead, an LID fulfills an important
role within the board and can enhance communication both among board
members themselves and between the board and management, while also
enhancing the board’s gatekeeping function. An LID is elected from among the
independent directors to act as their representative and can serve as “a point of
contact among the independent directors with whom management can discuss
ideas informally.”163 For example, in a letter to Wells Fargo’s LID, the Federal

155
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Reserve Board described the LID’s role:
As lead independent director, you had a responsibility to lead other
non-executive directors in forming and providing an independent view
of the state of the firm and its management . . . To fulfill that role, you
needed to have sufficient information from management to understand
and assess problems at the firm.164

Proxy advisors ISS and Glass Lewis have successfully advocated for the LID
structure and recommend granting these directors specific powers. 165 ISS, for
example, considers a lead director role to be robust only if elected by and from
the independent members of the board.166 According to ISS, the LID “should
also have clearly delineated and comprehensive duties,” including at least
serving as a liaison between the chair and independent directors; approving what
information is sent to the board; approving board meeting agendas; approving
meeting schedules; maintaining authority to call meetings of independent
directors; and maintaining availability for communication with major
shareholders upon request.167
Large investors have also pushed for more independent oversight in the form
of an Independent Chair or LID. Institutional investor TIAA-CREF, for
example, notes that “a company should disclose how the [LID’s] role is
structured to ensure they provide an appropriate counter balance to the
CEO/chair.”168 CalPERS recommends implementing an LID in the absence of
an Independent Chair, and notes that the position “provides shareholders and
directors with a valuable channel of communications should they wish to discuss
concerns relating to the chair.”169 CalPERS offers a list of the twelve minimum
duties an Independent Chair or LID must fulfill, including “oversee[ing] the
process of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO[;] . . .
approv[ing] the retention of consultants who report directly to the board;” and
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assisting the board in assuring compliance with governance principles. 170
Perhaps in a nod to the important monitoring role the LID plays,171 even the
Business RoundTable advises companies to appoint an LID in the absence of an
Independent Chair.172 And indeed, that pressure has led to a significant rise in
the prevalence of LIDs. In 2020, 58% of the S&P 500 companies had an LID on
their board.173
II. BOARD GATEKEEPERS: THE PROBLEMATIC SOLUTION TO
DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE
Today, as noted, most large public companies have taken action to address
investors’ and courts’ growing demand for independent boards, and in the push
for truly independent leaders, companies have installed two key internal
gatekeepers to guard the board. They have separated the roles of CEO and chair
of the board, in many cases choosing instead to install an Independent Chair at
the board’s helm. Additionally, companies have implemented the role of LID,
particularly when their CEO still holds the title of chair. In many ways, these
movements have come to life through private ordering, without regulatory or
stock exchange prescription.174 This has allowed companies not only to pick and
choose their preferred leadership structure, but also to self-designate the powers
granted to these gatekeepers.
Herein lies the problem. While the creation of new gatekeepers with the
potential to improve board monitoring and communication are important
developments, they are, to a large extent, untested and ununiform. Moreover, the
voluntary nature of the creation of these roles and the allowance for private
ordering also carries with it significant concerns. Nothing prevents companies
from establishing an LID in name only, with no additional powers or
responsibilities compared to her peer directors. Similarly, nothing prevents
companies from separating the roles of CEO and chair, but installing a chair that
is not truly independent.
Thus, to the extent that these new gatekeepers are merely symbolic, an
increased reliance by investors and regulators on gatekeepers as a pivotal
component in the board’s ability to monitor management may not only prove to
170
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be unwarranted, but may also allow companies to further insulate themselves
from shareholder and stakeholder monitoring. To examine these concerns, this
Article analyzes hand-collected data from the S&P 500 companies (larger
companies), as well as a sample of 400 S&P 600 and Russell 3000 companies
(smaller companies). The data illuminates several key concerns regarding both
the independence of these gatekeepers as well as the powers afforded to them.
A. Lead Independent Directors
As previously outlined, corporate boards increasingly use an LID to bolster
independent leadership on the board.175 These gatekeepers are meant to serve as
an additional check on board chairs, especially if the chair is not independent.
Yet, while many market participants agree that, in principle, independent board
leadership is needed, disagreement exists as to whether an LID can substitute for
the ideal of an Independent Chair.176
Ultimately, the powers granted to independent directors, specifically when
it comes to LIDs, may prove pivotal in addressing this concern. The sections that
follow provide the first-of-its-kind in-depth exploration of LIDs in the U.S.,
providing both descriptive data regarding their prevalence as well as handcollected data regarding their powers. The data exposes one of the key flaws
with the current landscape of LIDs. LIDs are, in many cases, granted fewer
enumerated powers than one might hope. In fact, LIDs may have essentially
become “lead” in title only.
1. Methodology
Granular LID data was hand-coded for companies within the S&P 500 and
a random sample of 400 companies interspersed throughout the S&P 600 and
Russell 3000 to measure the powers companies grant to their LIDs. This data
was collected by reviewing each company’s investor relations website,
corporate governance guidelines (which are often disclosed because the NYSE
requires listed companies to adopt and disclose them177), and bylaws. Each
company’s available governance documents were culled to determine whether
the company utilized an LID and the text of each power granted was gathered.
To maintain uniformity between data sets, thirty-seven “common” powers
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176

Successor CEOs, supra note 74, at 800–01.
Cf. id. at 801 (suggesting that some firms are changing from calls for independent chairs to calls for

LIDs).
177
PATRICK SCHULTHEIS & JEANA KIM, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS 9 (2017) (copy on file with the Emory Law Journal).
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were identified as allowing an LID to fulfill their intended role adequately and
robustly as a boardroom gatekeeper and as a truly independent check on
management. These powers encompass all facets of board service, from
oversight of meeting agendas to guiding CEO succession planning; a full
breakdown of the powers is included in Appendix A. Any powers, qualifications,
or restrictions were coded accordingly. The data ranges from the personal
characteristics of the LIDs, such as their career trajectory leading to the position,
as well as more structural data, such as what powers each company grants to
these gatekeepers in its organizational documents. Such data includes the
prevalence of the LID position across the indices, the conditions under which a
company requires an LID to serve on the board, and the LID’s tenure. Each
company’s corporate governance guidelines were also reviewed to see if there
were any term limits imposed, restrictions on access to information, or specific
qualifications required for the LID.
The hand-collected data was coded, consolidated, and analyzed to assess the
powers that LIDs are granted in three different complementary ways that are
further discussed herein. First, a “Simple Score” was calculated based on the
total number of powers each company’s LID was allocated. Next, the powers
were classified as strong, medium, and weak to assess the level or responsibility
that each power grants. Lastly, the “Super Score” for each company was
calculated to reflect any powers that were qualified by limiting language, limited
ability to exercise, or shared power.
First, this Article provides an easily digestible and direct comparison across
the S&P 500, S&P 600, and Russell 3000 using a “Simple Score” analysis.
Simple Scores, true to their name, reflect only the number of powers that each
company grants to their LID. Thus, a Simple Score of 8 or a company’s LID
means that the company grants their LID eight distinct powers out of the possible
thirty-seven powers identified in Appendix A. To provide a more nuanced view
into these powers, we then labelled each granted power as either “Explicit” or
“Qualified.” An Explicit power is one with no limitations in application,
exclusivity, or strength. Conversely, a Qualified power is subject to one or more
such limitations. The Explicit or Qualified label does not factor into the Simple
Score but acts instead as an additional metric for comparison.
Second, each power was classified as strong, medium, or weak based on the
level of responsibility given to each LID. Powers that were classified as strong
are crucial to the LID’s ability to guide the board and enhance communication.
For example, some powers that were classified as strong include presiding at all
board meetings when the chair is not present and leading the evaluation of the
chair’s performance. Weak powers include things like facilitating
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communication generally or providing feedback to the CEO or senior
management.
Finally, in addition to the Simple Scores, the data for the S&P 500 companies
was further analyzed utilizing a multifaceted coding methodology, resulting in
a “Super Score” for each LID power. A company’s Super Score reflects three
benchmarks: (1) How “qualified” the language of a given power is; (2) Whether
that power resides solely with the LID; and (3) Whether that power is “active”
or requires a triggering event to be exercised.
An individual company-level analysis was then performed by scoring each
granted power based on the three benchmarks mentioned above. The first
benchmark—strength of language—incorporates some subjectivity. If a power
has strengthening language, it receives a +1 score; conversely, if the power is
materially weakened, it receives a –1 score. For example, a neutral phrasing of
communicating with major stockholders would earn a strength score of zero
since it has no strengthening or weakening language. However, “[i]s available
for consultation/communication with significant shareholders, when
appropriate”178 would earn a negative strength score because it is qualified by
“when appropriate.” Conversely, acting as “the principal representative of the
independent directors in communicating with . . . shareholders”179 earns a
positive strength score due to the addition of “principal representative.”
The second and third benchmarks—exclusivity and activity—are relatively
objective. If a power is granted solely to an LID, it receives a +1; conversely, if
the power is shared, it receives a 0. Further, if an LID may exercise the power at
any time she pleases, the power is “active” and receives a +1; conversely, if the
power requires a triggering event or is limited in application, it receives a 0. For
example, a natural phrasing of “liaison between insiders and other directors” is
active at UnitedHealth Group where the LID serves “as the principal liaison
between the Independent Directors and the Chair.”180 Meanwhile, it is dormant
in Raytheon Technologies Corporation’s phrasing of “[a]t the request of the
independent directors, the Lead Director shall serve as liaison on Board-wide
issues between the independent directors and the Executive Chairman.” 181 To
178
GEN. DYNAMICS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 5 (2019), https://s22.q4cdn.com
/891946778/files/doc_downloads/gov_docs/2019/corporate-governance-guidelines-5-2019.pdf.
179
LEGGET & PLATT INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 3 (2021), https://leggettsearch.com/governance/corporate-governance-guidelines.asp.
180
UNITEDHEALTH GRP. I NC., BOARD OF DIRECTORS PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE 2 (2022),
https://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/content/dam/UHG/PDF/About/UNH-Principles-of-Governance.pdf.
181
RAYTHEON TECHS. CORP. RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION C ORPORATE GOVERNANCE
GUIDELINES
8
(2022),
https://prd-sc101-cdn.rtx.com/-/media/rtx/our-company/corporategovernance/media/documents/corporate-governance-guidelines--april-25-

122

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:91

calculate the Super Score, the three numbers were added. Each combined score
was then summed up for each of the thirty-seven powers to reach a final number.
Each section will present the coded Super Scores for the S&P 500 and Simple
Scores for the S&P 500, S&P 600, and Russell 3000.
2. Lead Independent Directors’ Prevalence
Appointing an LID has become a best practice for companies that have
maintained a combined CEO-chair role.182 This is partly the result of a New
York Stock Exchange listing requirement that companies have non-management
directors hold regularly scheduled executive sessions without management,
overseen by a “presiding” director.183
Indeed, the lead director role has grown in popularity, as more and more
firms elect to designate an LID. Proxy advisor Glass Lewis has noted that
declining support for proposals calling for independent chairpersons (which
decreased from 31.5% in 2014 to 28.9% in 2016) could be tied to the creation or
the strengthening of LID roles.184 In 2017, only 11% of companies in the S&P
1500 had neither an LID nor an Independent Chair, which is marked
improvement over 2008, where 33% of the companies lacked either position.185
As of 2020, only five boards in the S&P 500 did not report having either an
Independent Chair or an LID.186 Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, S&P 500 firms
favor the LID approach as opposed to instituting an Independent Chair, with
61% of such firms reporting an LID in 2020,187 a slight increase from the 59%
reported in 2018.188

2022.pdf?rev=2e7d3ca2454840a49e9c018fce09a15f.
182
Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large
Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1289 n.22 (1998) (“[V]arious best practices documents
exhibit consensus as to the importance of director independence . . . .”).
183
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.03 cmt. (2009) (“To promote open discussion
among the non-management directors, companies must schedule regular executive sessions in which those
directors meet without management participation.”); PRAC. L. CORP. & SEC., LEAD DIRECTOR: UNDERSTANDING
AND FILLING THE ROLE, Westlaw 5-519-6933 (2022) (noting that NYSE listing requirements require companies
to have regular meetings of non-management directors).
184
Rosen, supra note 165 (suggesting decreased support for independent chairpersons because
companies have either created or strengthened the lead independent director’s responsibilities).
185
KOSMAS PAPADOPOULOS, ROBERT KALB, ANGELICA VALDERRAMA & JARED SORHAINDO,
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., U.S. BOARD STUDY: BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY PRACTICES REVIEW 10
(2018),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/board-accountability-practices-review-2018.pdf
(noting institutional investors are “gaining traction” after having “long encouraged boards to appoint
independent board leaders”).
186
2020 U.S. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX, supra note 150, at 18.
187
Similarly, Spencer Stuart found that LIDs account for a large percentage of these companies, with 73%
of companies having LID and only 34% having an independent chair. Id. at 3, 19.
188
Steve W. Klemash, Jamie C. Smith & Kellie C. Huennekens, Today’s Independent Board Leadership
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Figure 1: LIDs in S&P 500 Companies in 2020
Yet, despite the increasing prevalence of LIDs, companies maintain wide

discretion in choosing when to appoint an LID. Among the S&P 500 companies
that do disclose criteria, they most commonly require the board to maintain an
LID when the chair is not independent, when their leadership structure results in
a joint CEO-chair, or always. For example, the Coca-Cola Co. discloses in its
corporate governance guidelines that it delegates the decision whether to have a
dual CEO-chair to the board, but if the board determines a joint CEO-chair is in
the best interest of shareholders, the independent directors must appoint an
LID.189 Twenty percent of companies, however, do not require an LID in any
circumstances. Figure 2 below demonstrates the prevalence of each criterion.
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(Nov.
20,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/20/todays-independent-board-leadership-landscape.
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C O.,
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
GUIDELINES
(2020),
https://d1io3yog0oux5.cloudfront.net/_68e2c943e4f3167d9aaef6d804d03be9/cocacolacompany/db/719/7231/f
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Figure 2: Criteria for Adoption of LIDs in S&P 500 Companies

Never
Required 20%
Majority Vote
of
Independent
Directors 1%
Chair Not
Independent
32%

Always 24%
CEO-Chair
12%
CEO-Chair or
Chair not
Not Specified
Independent
3%
6%

Certainly, while companies may choose to utilize LIDs, they maintain
complete autonomy over when and whether they will adopt one at any given
time. Within the S&P 500, only 6% of companies did not disclose criteria for
when the company must appoint an LID and 20% of companies stated that an
LID is never required.190 Relatedly, because companies choose when to
designate an LID, some choose only to do so when the CEO and chair are the
same person,191 while others do so also when the chair is, herself, an insider.192
This essentially allows the company to choose when the heightened monitoring
that an LID theoretically provides is necessary.

Finally, although there is relatively widespread disclosure of companies’
policies governing when an LID must be appointed, only 7% of companies
disclosed the qualifications or characteristics required of their LID.193
Furthermore, most of these qualification requirements include meeting the
definition of independent in accordance with relevant listing standards. This
emphasizes the wide discretion that corporate insiders have when choosing
to appoint a director as the LID.
A review of the corporate governance guidelines and company websites
for the S&P 500 and a selection of companies within the S&P 600 and
Russell 3000 has shown that smaller companies often do not have the same
190

Information on file with the author.
See, e.g., Corporate Governance Guidelines, BANK OF N.Y. MELLON CORP. (Dec. 13, 2021),
https://www.bnymellon.com/us/en/investor-relations/corporate-governance/corporate-governanceguidelines.html.
192
See, e.g., BEST BUY CO., INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 4 (2019),
http://s2.q4cdn.com/785564492/files/doc_downloads/Gov_docs/2019/09/13/Corp-Gov-Principles-Sept2019.pdf.
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Information on file with the author.
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corporate governance requirements in place, and, when they do, there is little
visibility into the requirements they have adopted. Where 93% of the S&P
500 disclosed requirements for when an LID was required, only 28% of our
selection within the S&P 600 had requirements listed within their corporate
governance guidelines.194 Even worse, no corporate governance guidelines
within the sample of Russell 3000 companies had any mention of LID
requirements.195
3. LIDs’ Tenuous Independence
LIDs’ prevalence, while nonuniform, is growing. Yet, LIDs fall prey to the
same concerns that befall other directors who are deemed independent by their
companies’ self-designations.196 First, LIDs suffer from designation
discretion—the company has the discretion to decide whether a director is
considered independent.197 Therefore, the same concerns that plague
independent director designations generally apply to LIDs as well, only now
with heightened stakes, as those concerns pertain to a key gatekeeper in the
boardroom.198
The following example illustrates this subjectivity in LID designations: in
2016, Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple, became the LID of Nike’s board.199
However, Cook’s classification as “independent” is puzzling. Prior to Cook’s
appointment, Nike and Apple had long been partners. Their relationship dates
back to 2006, when the two companies joined forces and released the Nike+
iPod.200 This alliance was strengthened when Apple launched the Apple Watch
Nike+, which some feel was “Nike’s reward” for discontinuing its Nike
FuelBand—a similar product, which arguably would have placed the two
companies in competition.201 Nike, however, like the majority of its peers, does
194

Id.
Id.
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Yaron Nili, The Fallacy of Director Independence, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 491, 507 (2020) [hereinafter
Fallacy of Director Independence].
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Id. at 508.
198
See id.; Out of Sight, supra note 19, at 53.
199
Nike, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 4, 21 (Sept. 22, 2016).
200
Press Release, Apple, Inc., Nike and Apple Team Up to Launch Nike+iPod (May 23, 2006),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2006/05/23Nike-and-Apple-Team-Up-to-Launch-Nike-iPod/;
Press
Release, Apple, Inc., Apple & Nike Launch the Perfect Running Partner, Apple Watch Nike+ (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.apple.com/gr/newsroom/2016/09/07Apple-Nike-Launch-the-Perfect-Running-Partner-AppleWatch-Nike-/; Mark Sullivan, Apple Watch Sales Were Way Up over the Holidays, Slice Data Shows, FAST CO.
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3067040/apple-watch-sales-were-way-up-over-the-holidaysslice-data-shows.
201
Mark Sullivan, Apple Watch Nike+ May Be Nike’s Reward for Letting FuelBand Die, FAST CO. (Sept.
7, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3063539/apple-watch-nike-may-be-nikes-reward-for-letting-fuelbanddie.
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not disclose its standard for determining independence, nor does it impose
heightened requirements for the role of LID,202 allowing the “independence”
designations of directors like Cook to go unchecked despite close ties with
company operations and management.
It is worth noting that Apple’s compensation committee includes Nike as
one of its “peer companies,”203 meaning Apple reviews Nike’s “compensation
practices and program design” to use as a benchmark for setting its own
management compensation.204 Interestingly enough, Cook is the chair of Nike’s
compensation committee,205 meaning he has a say on Nike’s management
compensation—a factor Apple’s compensation committee will consider when
deciding how to set Cook’s own salary as Apple’s CEO. Thus, in theory, Cook
has the power to influence Apple’s compensation committee by raising
compensation at Nike. The long-standing partnership between the companies,
combined with Cook’s ability to influence his own compensation via his role on
Nike’s compensation committee, raises substantial doubt as to his ability to be a
truly independent monitoring check. The current LID framework, however, does
nothing to account for this misalignment and Tim Cook still serves as LID for
Nike.206
Companies generally do not regulate how long an LID can serve. Only
twenty-seven companies within the S&P 500 included a minimum tenure
requirement within their corporate governance guidelines; the minimum terms
imposed ranged anywhere from one year to seven years on the board. 207 Even
fewer companies impose a maximum term limit for the LID. Only nineteen
companies (4%) of the S&P 500 dictate the maximum number of consecutive
years or terms that an LID may serve in that role.208 The average term limit for
companies with a maximum listed in their corporate governance guidelines is
five years.209
Because of the lack of term limits imposed, as Figure 3 below depicts, this
Article’s survey of the S&P 500 companies finds that many LIDs are relatively
long-tenured. As a particularly egregious example, George Carter was elected to
the People’s United Financial, Inc. board in 1976, and has served as the board’s
202
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204
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chair/LID for fourteen years, for a total tenure of forty-six years.210 Long tenure
has been increasingly deemed to reduce a director’s independence, since the
significant human capital, social ties, equity, and reputation invested in the
corporation that long-term directors have culminated over time might
compromise independent directors’ willingness to act independently or hold
insiders accountable.211 This concern is even more important when applied to a
key gatekeeper such as the LID.
Figure 3: Companies Within the S&P 500 with the Longest LID Tenure
The findings above are especially concerning given that many LIDs serve
on the board for several years prior to assuming the role of LID. For example,

in 2020, Meredith Corporation elected Donald Baer as the board’s LID. 212
Interestingly, Baer had already been a member of the Meredith Board of
Directors since 2014, offering him six extra years to form ties and work closely
with management.213 A more extreme example can be found with United Health
Group’s LID who served on the company’s board and learned the ins and outs
of the company for forty years prior to his nomination to this position. For the
287 companies that currently have an LID in the S&P 500, the average number
of years served prior to becoming an LID is nine years.214 The average LID

People’s United Financial, Inc., Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), at 6 (Apr. 2, 2019).
See New Insiders, supra note 80, at 149–50.
212
Press Release, Meredith Corp., Meredith Corporation Board Elects Baer Lead Independent Director
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tenure is four years.215 Figure 4 below shows the correlation between the number
of years a director spent on the board before being appointed as LID and their
LID tenure for companies within the S&P 500 that had an LID in 2020.
Figure 4: LID Director Tenure for the S&P 500
LIDs typically sit on more committees than the average number of
committees that directors sit on for each index, especially within smaller
companies that make up the Russell 3000. LIDs across all indices sat on 2.3

committees on average compared to an average of 1.6 for non-LID directors.216
While committee service is an important facet of a director’s role and can allow
the LID to gain invaluable information, it also raises concern of overwork,
potentially taking away from the LID’s ability to focus on the big picture.
Further complicating the issue, increased tenure can also lead to an increased
equity stake in a company. This can prove especially worrisome when the LID
accumulates a significant stake in the company, arguably diverging her interests
from those of long-term shareholders.217 For example, American Airlines
215
216
217

Id.
Id.
Michael Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 187 (2020)
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Group’s LID, John Cahill, recently purchased $628,000 worth of shares, 26%
more shares than he previously owned.218 This comes against the backdrop of
other board members, such as the CEO-chair, William Parker, purchasing $1.4
million in shares.219 The stakes acquired by key members of American Airlines’
board may overly align their interests with those of management, focusing on
immediate stock returns rather than the long-term prospect of the corporation.
These corresponding interests raise doubts as to whether the board can
effectively carry out its role of monitoring management and informing
shareholders—even if that would entail short-term stock depreciation.
Further, an overwhelming majority of LIDs are white men, and the lack of
diversity in leadership roles in the boardroom could be indicative of social bias
and an old boys’ club atmosphere that could prevent independent thinking,
inquiry, and monitoring.220 Only 6% of all LIDs included within this analysis
are female, and all of their respective companies were included within the S&P
500 or S&P 600.221 Interestingly, companies that did appoint female LIDs within
each index allocated, on average, two more powers than to their male
counterparts. For example, the thirty-three female LIDs within the S&P 500
were allocated ten powers on average compared to eight powers allocated to the
male LIDs within the same index.222
4. Lead Independent Directors’ Powerless Powers
Putting aside the concerns regarding the intrinsic independence of LIDs,
these directors must be given the tools necessary to effectively ensure that the
board remains independent—in other words, whether their functional
independence is protected. But the data reveals that the strain on LIDs’
gatekeeping abilities is exacerbated by the limited powers they are afforded.
Almost 85% of all companies within the S&P 500 mention LIDs within their

(reviewing the growing concerns relating to managers chasing short-term profits while presenting a contrary
concern regarding overvaluing long-term projects); Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Equity Compensation for
Long-Term Results, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 16, 2009),
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218
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Bought
26%
More
Shares,
SIMPLY
WALL
ST.
(Feb.
27,
2020),
https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/transportation/nasdaq-aal/american-airlines-group/news/the-lead-independentdirector-of-american-airlines-group-inc-nasdaqaal-john-cahill-just-bought-26-more-shares/.
219
Id.
220
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corporate governance guidelines.223
Appendix B shows the number of companies within each Super Score that
granted “positive” language, which provides an LID with the ability to act, and
“negative” language, which has qualified it in some way, either by limiting
language in terms of exclusivity or strength. As Appendix B further details, 95%
of all companies that mention LIDs within their corporate guidelines afforded at
least one power to them.224 However, only 20% of the companies with an LID
awarded powers that were not qualified by any limiting language, which
subjugates the LID’s functional power.225 Generally, as a company designates
more specific powers to an LID, the more likely it is to undermine these powers
with qualifying language that restricts the LID’s ability to act effectively. On
average, 75% of the positive powers designated to a company with a Super Score
of 1–10 are offset by net negative factors.226 However, this number increases to
87% for Super Scores of 11–22.227
Figure 5: Explicit Powers Delegated to LIDs in the S&P 500
Indeed, ISS advocates assigning several key duties to LIDs, including the
following: “serv[ing] as liaison between the chairman and the independent
directors; approv[ing] information sent to the board; approv[ing] meeting
agendas for the board; approv[ing] meeting schedules to assure that there is
sufficient time for discussion of all agenda items;” retaining the ability to call
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meetings of the independent directors; and, if requested by major shareholders,
being available for consultation and direct communication.228 While each of
these powers is highly prevalent among companies, the powers are often
qualified by limiting language that suppresses LIDs’ powers. 229 For example,
“approving information sent to the board” becomes “[a]pproves, in consultation
with the Chairman of the Board and other members of senior management and
to the extent practicable, the information to be provided to the Board;” 230 and
“approving meeting agendas for the board” becomes “advising the Chairman on
the agenda for Board meetings.”231 This limiting language hamstrings the
effectiveness of the LID structure and introduces the possibility that LIDs may
serve a symbolic, rather than functional, role.
Furthermore, close to 20% of the powers delegated to LIDs are what can be
termed as “dormant,” meaning that they can only be exercised in specific
circumstances.232 For example, the most common dormant power is one that is
inherently dormant by design—the LID’s power to preside at board meetings
when the chair is unable to attend.233 This power only triggers when the chair is
unable to attend a board meeting.
Importantly, most of the powers that companies grant to LIDs are
nonexclusive, meaning the LID lacks the authority and discretion to act on her
own in these situations. For example, instead of approving or setting board
meeting agendas, the LID at Johnson Controls, “[i]n collaboration with the
Chair and Chief Executive Officer, develops Board meeting agendas to ensure
that topics deemed important by the independent directors are included in Board
discussions and sufficient executive sessions are scheduled as needed.”234 Fiftyseven percent of the powers granted to LIDs across the S&P 500 are
nonexclusive, meaning the LID maintains exclusive authority and discretion
with only 43% of their enumerated powers.235
228
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Although 85% of companies reference LIDs within their corporate
governance guidelines, only 58% of the companies in the S&P 500 currently
have an LID on the board.236 As Figure 6 below shows, 11% of those companies
with an LID have not granted them any specifically enumerated powers. Of the
majority of companies that have granted at least one power, there is still
significant variance in terms of the number of powers allocated and the strength
of those powers. Forty-nine percent of companies with an LID in the S&P 500
are below the median Super Score of 6, and an additional 25% of companies
have a Super Score of 7, 8, or 9.237 In these circumstances, LIDs enjoy some
explicit delegations of power, but by no means do they wield the full suite of
powers that a fully empowered LID could otherwise enjoy. In fact, the platonic
“fully empowered LID” simply does not exist—Medtronic plc, the company
with the highest Super Score, only garnered a Super Score of 22. Even then,
Medtronic plc has two instances of limiting powers where the LID must first
consult or work directly with the chair or CEO.238
Figure 6: LID Super Scores in the S&P 500

To provide a deeper insight into exactly which powers each company
granted its LID, we constructed Appendix A. Appendix A shows that, of the
thirty-seven crucial powers that an S&P 500 company could grant its LID, the

most common (76%) was the ability of the LID to preside at executive sessions
of the Independent Directors.239 The second- and third-most prevalent granted
powers pertain to setting the structure and content of board meetings and serving
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as a liaison between insiders and other directors.240 Conversely, the least
prevalent powers concerned more substantial delegations of authority, such as
assisting in determining when to relax securities requirements and deciding to
direct specific matters to the Audit Committee.241 As shown within Appendix
A, while the five powers that are granted most often are powers classified as
delegating a high degree of responsibility or ability to act, the next most popular
powers are classified as “weak,” and these powers are ancillary to the main
objectives, like seeking feedback or communicating with shareholders as
appropriate.242 There are a handful of critical powers crucial to the role of an
LID that are rarely granted, like participating in chair evaluations or the ability
to call special board meetings.
To better understand the relationship between company size and LIDs,
powers granted to LIDs within the S&P 500 were compared to the powers
granted to LIDs in a random sample of small-cap companies. Figure 7 below
displays the Simple Scores for companies across each index. From a random
sample of 400 companies, consisting of 200 from the S&P 600 and 200 from the
bottom of the Russell 3000, 104 and 40 companies from the S&P 600 and
Russell 3000, respectively, had LIDs. The presence of an LID is far more
prevalent in larger companies than companies with a smaller market
capitalization. Only 20% of our sample for the Russell 3000 had an LID,
compared to 52% and 58% of the S&P 600 and S&P 500, respectively. Even
when companies within the Russell 3000 have an LID, they are more likely not
to designate any powers to the LID compared to the other two indices. Larger
companies are more likely to designate more powers to the LID to allow them
to act. The median Super Score is 6, 7, and 8 for the Russell 3000, S&P 600, and
S&P 500, respectively. More companies within the S&P 500 designate thirteen
or more powers than smaller companies within the S&P 600 or Russell 3000.
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Figure 7: Simple Score Across Market Cap243
An analysis of each power’s prevalence throughout the S&P 600 and the

Russell 3000, as shown in Appendix D, mirrors that of the S&P 500. Power “2,”
presiding at executive sessions of the independent directors, remains the most
prevalent power in each index.244 Other prevalent powers are “1,” presiding at
board meetings when the chair is not present; “3,” serving as a liaison between
insiders and other directors; and “4,” approving board meeting agendas. 245
Similar to the S&P 500, the most prevalent powers do not entrust the LID with
a great deal of actionable powers, such as retaining independent advisors,
directing matters to relevant committees, or approving stock transactions of
company insiders.
Importantly, the least common powers (≤0.5% in all exchanges), in
comparison, are “32,” helping determine whether to grant exceptions to
securities policies; “33,” directing specific matters to the Audit Committee;
“35,” approving insider stock transactions; and “36,” vice-chairing the board.
There is a stark difference between these two sets of powers: the most common
relate to overseeing broad functions of the board and facilitating discussions
among members.246 In comparison, the least common powers grant the LID the
authority to act on her own, outside the confines of the regular board meeting.
It should be noted that the data pulled for the S&P 600, and especially the
Russell 3000, may be incomplete. This is because a significant number, 160
(80%), of the 200 analyzed companies in the Russell 3000 either do not have an
LID, do not have corporate governance guidelines in place, or do not make them
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publicly available.247 The unavailability of these documents prevented a
complete analysis but leads to additional questions regarding the governance
practices of these companies. Without available guidelines, how are investors to
understand the internal governance of these companies? Without public access
to this information, shareholders, both active and prospective, are left in the dark.
Understanding the number of powers granted to companies throughout the
three exchanges is useful but adding another dimension to the analysis—whether
the powers are Explicit or Qualified—aids the understanding of the current field
of play for LIDs. Appendix H details the average number of qualified powers as
a percent of total powers allocated to each LID for each Simple Score. The data
shows that companies with a Simple Score of 3 and 4 are most likely to
materially qualify the powers allocated.248 On average, when a company
allocates only four powers to an LID, at least two of those are qualified in some
way, limiting their ability to act on their own volition.249 In comparison,
companies with higher Simple Scores not only grant more powers in general,
but are less likely to materially limit a majority of those granted powers. 250 This
is particularly important because it means that LIDs with few powers are further
hamstrung by having these enumerated powers weakened through limiting or
qualifying language. This creates an entire subset of LIDs that are “Lead” in title
only. On the flip side, this also indicates the existence of a subset of LIDs that
are truly empowered, not only with different delegated powers, but also with the
tools and language to carry out their designated roles and act as effective
gatekeepers. Notably, however, this empowered subset does not account for the
majority of LIDs.
As previously discussed, each of the powers identified have been classified
as strong, medium, or weak based on the level of responsibility authorized to an
LID. An analysis of the number of strong powers allocated as a percent of total
powers revealed that, on average, 68% of all powers allocated to LIDs authorize
them to act in a way that maximizes their role as a gatekeeper. 251 Of the
companies that allocated at least one power to the LID, only one company did
not allocate any strong powers.252 However, out of twenty potential strong
powers or responsibilities identified, LIDs within the S&P 500 are allocated, on
average, only 4.5 strong powers.253 Around one-third of the companies within
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the S&P 500 with a Super Score of 1, 2, or 3 have allocated only strong powers
to the LID.254 As shown in Table 1 below, as companies allocate more powers,
the percent of strong powers allocated as a percent of total powers generally
decreases.
Table 1: Strength of Powers Allocated

Super Score
1-3
4-6
7-9
10 - 12
13 - 15
16 - 18
19 - 20

Average Percent of Strong Powers as Percent of Companies with
a Percentage of Powers Allocated
100% Strong Powers
67%
27%
66%
10%
63%
8%
56%
16%
51%
16%
48%
6%
44%
0%

B. Independent Chairs
In addition to LIDs, Independent Chairs also provide a key gatekeeping
function. As the push for independent monitoring gained traction, so too did a
push to separate the roles of CEO and chairperson of the board. This, in turn,
has led to 51.5% of S&P 500 companies now holding Independent Chairs. 255
Furthermore, Independent Chairs are prevalent gatekeepers in large S&P 500
companies. While 287 companies within the S&P 500 had LIDs as of 2020, 61%
of the companies that did not have an LID had an Independent Chair, and about
45% of the companies with an LID also elected to have an Independent Chair.256
Unlike LIDs, however, if a board has an Independent Chair, the board must
designate a chairperson as the leader of the board. The board then chooses
whether to implement an Independent Chair or a different type of leadership,
such as a dual CEO-chair or other non-Independent Chair. As recently as 2010,
60% of S&P 500 boards maintained a dual CEO-chair structure, meaning the
majority of boards maintained an insider-executive at their helm.257 Recall that
254
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the push for an Independent Chair arises from investors’ concerns that a CEO
who is also the chair has unrivaled influence over the board, which, in turn, may
compromise the board’s collective independence. Using a similar methodology
to that of our LID study, this Article analyzes both the prevalence of Independent
Chairs and the powers companies grant to their Independent Chairs.
1. Methodology
The data analysis for this section began again with a broad overview of
Independent Chairs throughout the S&P 500, and through a random selection of
the S&P 600 and Russell 3000, including items such as the prevalence of
“Successor CEOs”258 and the chair’s tenure on the board before assuming the
position. This Article then used the same multifaceted methodology employed
for the LIDs to collect a Super Score for each Independent Chair of an S&P 500.
Again, this score is an empirical reflection of three benchmarks: (1) how
“qualified” the language of a given power is; (2) whether that power resides
solely with the Independent Chair; and (3) whether that power is “active” or
requires a triggering event to be exercised. As previously discussed, each power
granted to the Independent Chairs was also classified as strong, medium, or weak
based on the level of responsibility given to the Independent Chair and their
ability to act without oversight from the CEO or senior management. Lastly,
after obtaining Super Scores for the S&P 500, this Article utilized the same
Simple Score methodology used for the LIDs across the S&P 500, S&P 600, and
Russell 3000.
2. Independent Chair Prevalence
In the last ten years, the number of companies in the S&P 500 that have dual
CEO-chairs has decreased from 60% in 2010, to only 45% in 2020.259
Shareholders’ focus on the chair as a key gatekeeper places an appropriate
weight on the importance of the chair’s role on the board. As the leader of the
board, the chair’s role cannot be understated, and an independent leader “curbs
conflicts of interest, promotes oversight of risk, manages the relationship
between the board and CEO, serves as a conduit for regular communication with
shareowners, and is a logical next step in the development of an independent
board.”260 Because the chair leads the board and board meetings, the chair
258
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maintains significant prestige among her board, allowing her to exert influence
during board deliberations and prior to important votes.261

However, while companies have increasingly split the roles of chair and
CEO, not all have replaced the chair with an independent leader. In fact, as of
2020, 55% of S&P 500 companies had split the role of chair and CEO but
replaced the chair with a non-independent leader.262 Thirteen percent of
companies appointed a different executive, such as the CFO or COO, as the
board chair, and 4% of companies appointed an outside related director such as
a major investor, retired company executive, or a director with business
relationships with the company.263 Notably, the company may also eschew
independent leadership while still splitting the roles by allowing the CEO to
remain chair after stepping down as CEO (in what was termed elsewhere as
“Successor CEOs”).264
Figure 8: Chair’s Relationship with Company
3. Tenuous Independence
Just like LIDs, Independent Chairs are subjected to the same concerns that
261
Yvonne D. Harrison & Vic Murray, Perspectives on the Leadership of Chairs of Nonprofit
Organization Boards of Directors: A Grounded Theory Mixed‐Method Study, 22 NONPROFIT MGMT. &
LEADERSHIP 411, 421 (2012); Michael C. Withers & Markus A. Fitza, Do Board Chairs Matter? The Influence
of Board Chairs on Firm Performance, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1343, 1345–46 (2017).
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befall other directors who are deemed independent.265 First, Independent Chairs,
too, suffer from designation discretion—the company has the discretion to
decide whether a director is considered independent. Consequently, the same
concerns that plagued independent director and LID designations generally
apply to Independent Chairs as well, but, again, with heightened stakes.
Importantly, the “Successor CEO” phenomenon is particularly troubling, since
companies often designate the former CEO as an “independent” chair despite
their prior role and enduring close connection with the company.266 Therefore,
this push to separate the roles based on a desire to improve board independence
vis-à-vis management becomes an empty exercise.267
This phenomenon undercuts board independence for two reasons. First,
having a former CEO on the board in conjunction with the current CEO may
subvert any power given to the rest of the independent directors, including an
appointed LID, if any.268 Second, because the ex-CEO, now chair, is not
technically an “insider,” companies may refrain from appointing an LID at all,
instead viewing the ex-CEO as sufficiently independent, despite her enduring
ties to the company. These designations and decisions highlight the problems
with company autonomy over independence designations, and further illustrates
that a title of “independent” may be just an illusion.
Notably, additional factors can compound the independence issues of
Independent Chairs who previously served as CEOs. Tenure among former
CEOs tends to be longer than other directors, with an average difference in
tenure of 8.6 years between ex-CEO chairs and their non-CEO counterparts,
which is compounded by the significant equity the former CEO accumulated
during her management service.269 In fact, Successor CEOs’ equity, compared
to other directors, is notably higher, and, in many years, almost double that of
other directors.270 In combination with extended tenure, these elevated levels of
equity raise significant concerns for a successor CEO’s ability to remain
independent when her interests, stemming from such equity, may diverge from
those of general shareholders. On average, chairs for companies within the S&P
500 spend eighteen years at the company in various capacities. Nonindependent
chairs serve on the board three years on average before they are appointed as
265

See discussion supra Sections I.C, II.A.
In fact, 24 of the 217 S&P 1500 companies in 2016 with Successor CEOs reported their chair as
independent despite being a former CEO of the company. See Successor CEOs, supra note 74, at 828.
267
See id. at 796, 805, 809.
268
See id. at 820; see also, e.g., The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation Corporate Governance
Guidelines, BANK N.Y. MELLON CORP. (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.bnymellon.com/us/en/investorrelations/corporate-governance/corporate-governance-guidelines.html.
269
Information on file with the author.
270
See generally Successor CEOs, supra note 74, at 827 fig.12.
266

140

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:91

chair, and the average chair tenure for nonindependent chairs is ten years. 271
Further, Independent Chairs sit on more committees compared to the average
for all chairs within a respective index. In 2019, Independent Chairs across all
indices served on an average of 1.7 committees, with a max of seven committees,
compared to only an average of 0.5 committees and a max of five committees
for Nonindependent Chairs.272
Independent Chairs are subjected to even more of a boys’ club environment
compared to LIDs. In 2020, only seven companies within the S&P 500 had
female Independent Chairs;273 that number rose slightly to 8% in 2021.274 No
companies within the sample of companies from the S&P 600 or Russell 3000
have any female Independent Chairs.275
4. Independent Chairs’ Powerless Powers
A Super Score analysis of the Independent Chair positions throughout the
S&P 500 is shown in Appendix F and depicts the net positive and net negative
language qualifications delegated for each company. Of the companies that have
a Super Score of 0, thirty-one companies did not grant the Independent Chair
any powers, and twenty-one companies granted the same number of positive
powers as offsetting negative powers.276 Only 34% of the companies that make
up the S&P 500 were designated powers that were not negated in any way by
offsetting negative language.277 Generally, companies with a lower Super Score
have a higher portion of net negative powers compared to net positive powers.278
There were six companies that had a negative Super Score where the corporate
governance guidelines only included limiting language.279
The remaining 72.9% of companies with a nonzero Super Score paint an
interesting picture, as shown in Figure 9 below. The most common Super Score
is 2 (7.2%), followed by 3, 1, and 4 (5.2%, 4.8%, and 4.6%, respectively).280 As
271
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previously noted, the function of a Super Score is to provide a useful heuristic
in evaluating exactly how empowered an Independent Chair may be.
Figure 9: Super Scores of the S&P 500
Overall, of the companies that grant their Independent Chair powers, those
powers might be significantly limited either in force, application, or unity within
the Independent Chair position. One could easily imagine a theoretical
Independent Chair with a robust set of powers that she could exercise at her own

discretion; such a chair would have a high Super Score. In fact, such a fully
empowered Independent Chair may appear similar to the Independent Chairs
currently serving at Starbucks Corp. or Delta Air Lines, Inc. (both companies

received a Super Score of 16).281 While not every company should, or even
could, exactly mirror its peers, these two companies provide a framework for
other companies to look to when examining the enumerated powers given to
their Independent Chair.
Figure 10: Simple Scores Among the Indices
The data presented in Figure 10 above shows the percentage of companies
in the S&P 500, S&P 600, and Russell 3000 with a certain Simple Score for
purposes of market capitalization comparison.282 Small-cap companies that
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make up the S&P 600 or Russell 3000 are more likely not to designate any
powers to the Independent Chair than larger companies within the S&P 500. In
fact, 62% of the companies within the selection from the Russell 3000 and 34%
of the companies within the selection from the S&P 600 did not grant any powers
to Independent Chairs.283 The data reveals that the most common number of
powers granted to an active Independent Chair within the S&P 500 was two.
Interestingly, the S&P 500 and the Russell 3000 tend to trend with each other
despite the stark difference in company size within each index. In contrast, the
S&P 600 has far more companies than the other two indices that grant their
Independent Chairs more than seven powers.
Like powers designated for LIDs, there is a significant likelihood that
powers are materially limited in application (“Qualified”) for companies with
lower Simple Scores (<6).284 Conversely, a company with a higher Simple Score
(>6) is much less likely to do the same.285 As shown in Appendix I, companies
that only allocate one power to the Independent Chair typically do not qualify
that power in any way.286 However, companies with a Simple Score between 2
and 6 typically qualify at least 44% of any powers allocated, whereas companies
with a Simple Score between 7 and 13 qualify, on average, only 19% of the
allocated powers.287
Again, simply knowing the number of powers granted to the Independent
Chair is not enough; to fully understand the current state of the Independent
Chair position within the current corporate governance landscape, it is necessary
to understand what powers the Independent Chair is likely to enjoy. As depicted
in Appendix G, among all three indices, the most prevalent power is “Approving
or Setting Board Meeting Agendas” (“4”).288 This is followed—again, among
all three exchanges—by “Presides at Executive Sessions of the Independent
Directors” (“2”).289 These two powers are largely supervisory, in that they allow
the Independent Chair to set up meetings of directors and guide the discussions
through setting agendas. The least common powers, in comparison, are those
that are more active and grant the Independent Chairs the authority to act in a
nonsupervisory manner, such as evaluating members of the Board and retaining
independent advisors.290
comparison across indices. All data is on file with the author.
283
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C. Doubling Up? When Independent Chairs are Joined by LIDs
A subset of companies has elected to include both an Independent Chair and
an LID in the boardroom. In the sampled data, 26.8% of the 900 companies
include both gatekeepers on their boards.291 Interestingly, the companies that
include both roles on their board might not be the governance leaders one might
infer them to be. In fact, when examining the aggregate Simple Scores of both
the Independent Chair and the LID, the average score is not markedly different
than that of a company with only an LID (average combined score of 9.7 vs. 8.6,
with an identical median of 9).292
More often, as Table 2 shows, companies that have either an LID or
Independent Chair have a higher average percentage of independent directors on
their boards compared to companies without either, and companies with both an
LID and an Independent Chair have the lowest average percentage of
independent directors on their boards altogether. This might indicate an attempt
by companies with larger insider, nonindependent, boards to offset that
perception with the inclusion of both gatekeeping roles even if the enumerated
powers remain relatively the same.
Table 2: Percentage of Independent Directors
When the board has an Independent Chair
When the board has an LID
When the board has neither
When the board has both

83.21
82.74
81.70
80.51

D. Enumerated Powers: The View from the Ground
This section presents data from original interviews with directors and
general counsels about the role of gatekeepers’ powers in the governance of
corporations. Directors and general counsels of public companies were
interviewed to develop further insight into the role of gatekeepers’ powers in the
governance of the corporation. A table describing the interviews is set out in
Appendix J. These directors served on companies ranging from large Fortune
500 companies to small Russell 3000 companies. To identify interview subjects,
a snowball sampling technique was employed, beginning with a sample of
directors taken from the membership of the National Association of Corporate
Directors, and then asking each interviewee for further references. The major
downside of snowball sampling is that it is difficult to obtain an unbiased
291
292
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sample. However, this technique provided access to directors and general
counsels who might have otherwise been disinclined to participate. Because of
the challenges associated with using snowball sampling and interviews in
general, these interviews only provide context and support to the importance of
gatekeepers and their enumerated powers.
1. The Importance of Gatekeepers
The interviews affirmed the growing importance of gatekeepers in the
boardroom. One public company director, for example, described the pressure
to add an LID to their board after several of their peer companies did so, and
how, after being appointed, the LID took charge of the board’s work in a new
way.293 Another director, who was the inaugural LID in their own company,
similarly pointed to the importance that investors, directors, and the CEO all saw
in the newly established position as a key feature of facilitating the board’s work
with both the management team and investors alike.294 A third interviewee
indicated that “independent leadership, whether lead independent directors or
independent chair, are [sic] extremely important.”295 A fourth interviewee, who
was an LID, highlighted the importance of the LID in cases of uncertainty. In
their company, there was an unexpected death of the chair and much uncertainty
about who would decide and lead the board in selecting a new chair (as the
guidelines had no clear details regarding how to navigate this). The LID took on
the role of leading the board and speaking to directors to navigate this uncharted
situation.
2. The Importance of Gatekeepers’ Explicit Powers
Our interviews revealed that directors and general counsels view the explicit
powers given to LIDs as particularly important.296 One aspect is making clear ex
ante what gatekeepers are allowed to do and therefore preventing future disputes
regarding their actions. For example, one interviewee highlighted the
importance of enumerated powers for the sake of the LID herself—articulated
powers protect the LID by giving her “something [she] can anchor back to.”297
Another director described a situation in which an activist shareholder attempted
to influence a company, the board of which he was a member. The LID took
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charge of communicating with the activist and brokering a deal, since they were
empowered to do so by the corporate governance guidelines. The director stated
that without such powers, such brokering might not have happened or, if it were
to happen, it might have been attacked by unhappy parties viewing the act as
unauthorized.298 Another interviewee suggested that it is important to be explicit
about powers.299 They stated that the importance is two-sided: “giving
shareholders an understanding of what to expect and also providing directors
and the CEO a better understanding of how the LID can serve their goals.” 300
Enumerated powers were viewed to serve a particularly important role in cases
in which the board itself was divided or fractured in a way that explicit powers
defused potential challenges from one fraction of the board. Another noted that
“explicit powers prevent the CEO/chair from encroaching on the LID’s role.”301
E.

A False Sense of Trust

While a fair number of companies grant their Independent Chair and/or LID
a number of significant powers, in many other instances, the data invokes a
concern of window dressing. Granting a broad range of superficial powers may
convey a false sense of trust to shareholders, while leaving the gatekeeping post
unmanned. To be effective, an Independent Chair and/or LID must have powers
sufficient to act, not merely to observe. Yet, the data shows that in many
companies, a majority of powers granted to both Independent Chairs and LIDs
are of a relatively procedural nature. They observe goings-on around the
company, plan agendas, and generally facilitate communication among the
directors. However, there is a distinct lack of actionable authority granted to
these two positions. In most cases, the Independent Chair and/or LID are unable
to actually serve as a fully empowered independent gatekeeper. Instead of
holding the line with sword in hand, these “gatekeepers” are more akin to an
unarmed watchman, observing the field of play but lacking both the strength and
authority to act.
These board gatekeepers, even when operating under a veneer of authority,
may be materially limited in the utilization of their powers. This is reflected by
the Super Score calculations; even an Independent Chair with five granted
powers could still, technically, receive a Super Score of 0 if each power is widely
shared, limited in application, or materially weakened through its granting
language. A company that grants its gatekeepers a wide range of limited powers
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might well be arming them with a sword, but also constricting them with chains
to a shared post.
The false sense of trust is further fueled by the reality that many LIDs and
Independent Chairs may not be independent at all. The data shows that board
gatekeepers suffer from the same ailments of independent directors as a class.
Long tenure, misalignment of incentives, and prior ties may all jeopardize the
willingness of gatekeepers to act, even when they are empowered to do so.
Granted, enumerated powers only convey an incomplete picture regarding
the specific power dynamic of any given board. Indeed, some LIDs and
Independent Chairs may be able to exert significant influence and power, even
without specific enumerated powers. Similarly, weak gatekeepers might not use
any of the powers at their disposal, even if, on paper, they are significant. Yet,
the point this Article makes is that despite outliers in either direction, it is hard
to ignore the vested authority given to gatekeepers. The enumerated powers that
are given to gatekeepers do set the tone in the boardroom, both in setting
expectations regarding the expected role of gatekeepers and, in many cases, in
their ability to carry them out. Moreover, as corporate misconduct is exposed,
the powers given to gatekeepers, if not utilized, are an effective tool in ensuring
ex post accountability of gatekeepers. Recall that in the Wells Fargo
investigation, the report specifically mentioned enumerated powers that were
not utilized by the LID as a key failure in preforming their role.302 In turn,
gatekeepers are likely to utilize their powers ex ante, knowing that they may be
held accountable in the future if they fail to utilize them.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Article exposes a stark divide between the apparent rise of independent
board gatekeepers and their functional independence. These key gatekeeping
positions have emerged in response to the modern-day push for increased
director and board independence. But, while investors have clamored for more
independent boards and tried to assure their ability to function independently by
appointing and insulating independent gatekeepers, companies have, once
again,303 muddied the water by chipping away at their functional powers and
their view of independence.
For true gatekeeping to take place, however, there must be a shift in how
board gatekeepers are designated as independent, in how independence is

302
303

Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See Fallacy of Director Independence, supra note 196, at 495–96.
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disclosed and perceived, and in how these key independent gatekeepers are
equipped to carry out their intended role. This Part focuses on each of these three
areas, identifying how the current divide can be bridged in an effort to ensure
that investors’ expectations of board gatekeepers are truly met.
A. Rethinking Gatekeepers’ Independence Designations
Investors, large and small, seek independent board leadership not only to
ensure the overall independence of the board, but also to ensure that they are
informed and have their interests represented.304 However, the process by which
directors, including Independent Chairs and LIDs, are classified as independent
has, for the most part, remained undisclosed. This lack of information requires
investors and shareholders to defer to companies’ self-designations.305 In a
sense, companies and boards are the gatekeepers of their own independence—
they are the fox guarding the henhouse. And, up until now, investors have not
challenged the process by which boards make independence designations,
ultimately allowing companies to convey a false sense of trust to investors and
regulators regarding the true independence of their board.
In order to ensure that, at a minimum, key independent figures on the
board—LIDs and Independent Chairs—are indeed independent, companies
must set clear and transparent criteria for determining independence. While the
minimum threshold requirements for director independence are set in exchange
guidelines,306 companies can and should maintain discretion regarding their own
concrete standards for independent leadership roles that should differ from, and
be more stringent than, the standard for independent directors generally.
While directors’ independence is an important matter for any director who
is designated as such by the board, the clout and power of board gatekeepers
merit specific attention to their functional independence. Moreover, since, in
many cases, companies only have one of these gatekeepers at any given point in
time, holding these gatekeepers to a heightened standard is unlikely to prove
detrimental to recruiting and retaining good directors—an argument often raised
in the context of board independence requirements.307
While tailoring the specific independence requirements should ideally be left
304
See Holly J. Gregory, Board Leadership and the Role of the Independent Lead Director, THOMAS
REUTERS PRAC. LAW (Mar. 1, 2018), https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-013-3518.
305
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 602
(2006).
306
See Gordon, supra note 84, at 1539–40.
307
See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 183–84
(2010).
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to companies, several components must be considered. First, LIDs or
Independent Chairs should be discouraged from serving on other companies’
boards. Having ties to other companies, especially within the same industry, can
compromise a director’s ability to devote adequate time308 to their role.309
Service on multiple boards may also jeopardize their ability to act independently.
After all, if directors serve on multiple boards, the interests of shareholders
across the companies they serve may, at times, diverge.
The Tim Cook example provides a clear illustration of the concerns such
service may entail—particularly where two companies have an existing
relationship or are competitors. Indeed, companies can require candidates for
key leadership roles on the board to limit their service on other boards, just as
many currently do for their CEOs.310 At the very least, it is important that
directors’ ties be considered and examined to ensure that the director is not
partial to another company within the same industry, which could compromise
their ability to loyally serve the company’s investors and shareholders.
Ultimately, these ties can lead to companies taking actions that are not in the
interests of shareholders, such as failing to engage in horizontal mergers and
acquisitions, due to their potential collusion with other companies in the
industry.311
Second, as the data demonstrates, many independent directors, particularly
LIDs, have previously served in a management role or are veterans of the board.
It is no surprise that former managers and current board members are top-ofmind when it comes to appointing a key leadership position on the board. But
the very fact that certain individuals are so closely intertwined with the company
308
See, e.g., Laura Field, Michelle Lowry & Anahit Mkrtchyan, Are Busy Boards Detrimental?, 109 J.
FIN. ECON. 63, 63–64 (2013) (finding that venture-backed IPO firms benefit from busy director expertise since
busy directors serve more as advisors than monitors); Ira C. Harris & Katsuhiko Shimizu, Too Busy to Serve?
An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors, 41 J. MGMT. STUD. 775, 775 (2004) (finding that
busy directors enhance acquisition performance through expertise); Wolfgang Drobetz, Felix von Meyerinck,
David Oesch & Markus Schmid, Industry Expert Directors, 92 J. BANKING & FIN. 195, 195 (2018) (“We analyze
the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which industry experience of outside
directors relates to firm value. Our analysis shows that firms with more experienced outside directors are valued
at a premium compared to firms with less experienced outside directors.”); George D. Cashman, Stuart L. Gillan
& Chulhee Jun, Going Overboard? On Busy Directors and Firm Value, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 3248, 3252
(2012).
309
See Jeremy McClane & Yaron Nili, Social Corporate Governance, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 949
(2021).
310
SPENCER STUART, 2016 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX: A PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. BOARDS 15 (2016),
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/pdf%20files/research%20and%20insight%20pdfs/spencer-stuart-usboard-index-2016_1mar2017.pdf (“20% of S&P 500 boards set a specific limit in their corporate governance
guidelines on the CEO’s outside board service; 97% of those boards limit CEOs to one or two outside boards.
One board does not allow the company CEO to serve on any outside corporate boards.”).
311
See Horizontal Directors, supra note 49, at 1228–30.
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should, at a minimum, raise flags as to their functional independence. In that
context, the case for capping the tenure of gatekeepers in their roles as
gatekeepers is particularly strong, reducing the significant concerns that long
tenure raises with respect to independence.312
Third, the compensation of these gatekeepers should account for their
gatekeeping function. If gatekeepers are to monitor management, their
compensation should be decoupled from that of management. For instance,
increasing the base pay component of their compensation package, as well as
long-term equity grants that are only exercisable several years after their
departure, can prove effective in increasing their independence.
B. Peer Group, Disclosure, and “Say on Independence”
Even if companies adopt criteria for determining whether a director is
independent, the change is a fruitless exercise unless the criteria is adequately
disclosed and accepted by investors and shareholders. The current system
imposes little accountability on companies to ensure their designations are
merited.313 One way to hold companies accountable is by requiring disclosure
of the factors weighed and the analysis undergone by the board—both of which
help determine whether or not a gatekeeper is truly independent—and a
summary of the powers granted to the gatekeeper stacked against peer groups.
Disclosing peer group analysis has become a key portion of pay
considerations for corporations, and the SEC now requires a company to disclose
its criteria for considering a company as a peer, which already encompasses such
factors as industry, size, and talent.314 This provides a quantifiable benchmark
against which companies can compare their governance practices that could
translate well to comparing powers granted to a gatekeeper. Moreover, peer
group benchmarking carries the promise of improving gatekeepers’
independence in the long run. Studies have shown that peer groups create a
ratcheting effect in companies that tend to adopt practices adopted by their peers
because they do not want to be the worst of their peers by any metric.315
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Consequently, requiring this disclosure would have two effects. It would
first allow shareholders, at the very least, to be informed and to pressure the
company where it is merited. It also would hold the board accountable for their
decisions, requiring them to articulate their reasoning for why and how they
determined a gatekeeper is independent. While, ideally, companies would
disclose their criteria for both independent directors and independent leadership
roles, companies should, at a minimum, be required to disclose their heightened
requirements for independent leadership roles.
To further hold companies accountable, upon receiving information
regarding a director’s independence, companies may wish to adopt a “say-onindependence” vote similar to the existing “say-on-pay” vote316 and recent
proposals on “say on corporate purpose.”317 A nonbinding shareholder vote on
gatekeepers’ independence would have the ability to influence corporate
behavior on a more nuanced company-specific level, since evidence indicates
boards react to negative say-on-pay votes by reducing excessive compensation
despite their nonbinding nature.318
This proposed ability for shareholders to challenge the board’s
classifications works twofold. First, it incentivizes the board to be transparent
and to state a particular and justifiable rationale as to why a director is
independent. Absent such rationale, the designation is more likely to be
challenged. Second, it also encourages boards and shareholders alike to consider
the overall board independence when electing a new director. For example, a
board could, when hiring a new director, indicate its intent to make a director
the Independent Chair or LID. It could then use the vote and subsequent election
of the director as shareholders’ assent to having the director classified as
independent. Therefore, the only time an additional vote could be elicited by a
shareholder’s challenge is when an existing director becomes an LID.
Ultimately, transparency through disclosures and shareholders’ ability to
challenge board designations would, at the least, create some accountability for
the average keeps on moving up—leading to a continuous increase (“ratchet”) in pay or other measurable
metrics. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. PERSPS. 5, 11 (2006).
316
Say-on-pay votes offer shareholders the opportunity to cast an advisory vote on the compensation of
the highest paid executives. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: SAY- ON-PAY AND GOLDEN PARACHUTE
VOTES 1 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/sayonpay.pdf.
317
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WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-give-shareholders-a-say-in-corporate-socialresponsibility-11607270401; Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
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boards in classifying directors and restore investors’ trust in the overall
independence of boards.
C. Courts’ Unfounded Deference
The presence of a truly empowered and independent LID or Independent
Chair could be important for Delaware cases where independent board processes
are important, such as controlling shareholder transactions or managementdriven decisions. In such instances, the Delaware court looks for a special
committee of independent directors fully empowered to say no to a transaction
as part of the court’s consideration to apply the deferential business judgment
rule, essentially allowing the existence of such directors to protect a transaction
from legal challenges to its fairness.319 Given that these decisions generally
center in part on the fairness of the underlying process of the transaction, and
that independent directors often grant companies a presumption of fairness, a
court could also look toward whether the company had a functionally effective
independent gatekeeper in place as an additional factor to weigh when
evaluating the underlying fairness. An effective gatekeeper, for instance, may
have protected and prevented the now-infamous board in Smith v. Van Gorkom
from a finding of gross negligence after the court determined the board made an
uninformed decision when pressed by the CEO when engaging in a buyout
merger.320
Courts also provide a second way to hold companies accountable. While
courts have, at times, taken inconsistent approaches when assessing whether a
director is independent, their role in reviewing company designations has
become increasingly important, and perhaps necessary. This is especially true
for approval of related-party transactions, which requires director independence
in order for the business judgment rule to apply.321 However, given the strong
presumption favoring directors’ actions that the business judgment rule affords,
it is perhaps problematic that the factor triggering its application is a selfdeclared classification of a director as “independent.”
Director independence is usually called into question by plaintiffs seeking
to remove a corporate decision from the protection of the business judgment rule
by casting doubt on the process by which the decision was made. 322 If the
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plaintiff adequately raises doubts about the directors’ independence, then
regardless of whether independence is truly compromised, the defendant has the
burden of overcoming these doubts. Often, in such cases, courts evaluate the
directors’ and board’s independence on a case-by-case basis.323 Nonetheless,
due to limited resources to investigate, courts often are deferential to the
company’s designations, absent a reason for further inquiry.
Within the current structure, if companies adopt the proposed disclosure
practices and provide at least the minimum enumerated powers to their
gatekeepers, this deference and presumption of a proper board process could
again have merit. Companies who disclose their requirements for classifying
board leadership roles as independent (and ideally for director independence
generally) and who grant independent leadership a minimum threshold of
enumerated powers would be more likely to be presumed to have an independent
board process. This reduces the likelihood of judicial intervention.
D. Stock Exchange Definitions
As discussed above,324 companies have approached the issue of designating
gatekeepers as independent in different, nonuniform ways. Some companies
treat the chair as nonindependent, while some refer to the NYSE’s three-year
“cooling-off period”325 and declare the chair as independent once that time has
elapsed, even if that chair has served as the CEO for the previous twenty years.
Some companies declare the chair as independent but nevertheless acknowledge
the need for an LID, while others do not even appoint an LID at all.326
Yet, designating a former CEO of the company as an independent director,
immediately or even after the “cooling-off period,”327 undermines the goal
behind director independence designations328 and is particularly concerning

presumption of business judgment.”).
323
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when the person declared as independent is a gatekeeper.329 This, in turn,
necessitates a reconsideration of the independence requirements for chairs, and
consideration by stock exchanges of potentially issuing specific minimum,
heightened, independence thresholds for board gatekeepers.
E. Functional Independence
As this Article has demonstrated, the current self-fulfilling structure for
designating a director as independent is problematic. However, perhaps even
more problematic is the inability of these key independent figures to effectively
carry out their intended role. This is especially important when an ex-CEO is the
chair, forcing the LID to face an uphill battle in curtailing management’s power
over the board.330 In these cases, the grip of the CEO on the boardroom is further
strengthened by the presence of an executive chair, leaving the LID at a distinct
disadvantage in the board’s power dynamics. Thus, Independent Chairs and
LIDs alike must have adequate enumerated powers to allow them to effectively
oversee management and interact with shareholders. The current system falls
short.
The current lack of power that independent directors are afforded is not only
due to an inability to obtain independent information or a lack of resources
available to obtain independent information.331 Rather, it is also due to a
combination of (1) directors not being afforded opportunities to leverage this
information; and (2) companies’ apparent apprehension to grant LIDs practical
executionary powers.332 This requires that investors and regulators rethink the
specific functions of the LID role. Indeed, as the data demonstrates, some
companies grant their LIDs greater responsibilities than others, but those
responsibilities vary by company and are often qualified with suppressing
language. Accordingly, a more formalized approach to allocating powers,
consistently applied across companies, may be warranted.333
Companies like Chevron Corporation and Sempra Energy, for example,
show that it is obtainable to have an LID appointed who is granted sufficient
powers to make a meaningful impact within their role. Chevron and Sempra

329

See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
See Captured Boards, supra note 22, at 29–30.
331
See id. (discussing approaches to maximizing the ability of a board to gather its information and data
from independent sources in order to minimize the dependence on management for such information).
332
See discussion supra Section II.B.4.
333
See generally Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law,
8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 131, 136–39, 141–42, 144 (2018) (arguing against conventional wisdom, which states that
firms effectively utilize private ordering to efficiently tailor governance terms to their particular needs).
330

154

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:91

have calculated Super Scores of 20 and 19, respectively.334 Each company
allocated over twenty powers with at least seven of those powers being strong.
They each only had one qualified power, which limited the LID’s ability to
communicate directly with shareholders as appropriate or as requested. 335
Additionally, the powers allocated to gatekeepers in these two companies are
clearly defined and listed within each company’s corporate governance
guidelines, as well as prominently displayed on their investor relations page. 336
One avenue through which investors could effectuate change for
independent leadership positions is through shareholder proposals. In fact,
shareholder proposal efforts have proven fruitful in recent years. Take, for
example, the Boardroom Accountability Project launched by New York City
Comptroller Scott Stringer in 2014.337 This project involved extensive
submissions of shareholder proposals regarding shareholder nomination of
directors in the company’s proxy statement (known as proxy access). 338 By
2017, 139 firms had implemented these proposals.339 Other shareholders
followed this initiative, submitting proxy access proposals themselves. 340 By
2019, almost 500 firms, over two-thirds of which were in the S&P 500, had
added proxy access to their bylaws. 341 This example demonstrates the manner in
which practices, specifically those related to board-related matters, can be
permeated through companies to effectuate change across the board.
While a project that is as comprehensive and well-backed as the Boardroom
Accountability Project may not be immediately feasible, it provides a potential
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framework for how to integrate meaningful independent director powers into
boardrooms. Proposals arguably should be uniform across companies and
provide set powers that the board must, at a minimum, grant the Independent
Chair or LID. These powers would not be subject to limiting language and would
be directly tied to these positions’ intended purpose.
Only once independent directors are given powers that are exercisable and
that provide them with the necessary tools to carry out their intended role—
ensuring the independence of the board as a whole—will the “independence”
title granted to these key figures be restored. And, once it is restored, courts can
rightfully grant the appropriate deference, and investors’ sense of trust can be
restored in both the designation process and the safeguarding of their interests.
CONCLUSION
Who will guard the guards? This ancient question is at the heart of this
Article. Boards are meant to guard management at the behest of investors and
stakeholders. Yet, boards themselves are mired with a host of structural and
personal concerns that hinder their independence. In a sense, the emergence of
board gatekeepers is an attempt to guard the guards and ensure that boards
perform their vital monitoring role at the behest of shareholders and society at
large.
Yet, while many boards now include these gatekeepers in title, questions still
surround their functional gatekeeping. As this Article demonstrated, many
company-proclaimed gatekeepers suffer from concerns regarding their
individual independence, their functional powers, or both. If gatekeepers are
present in name only, then the question of who will guard the guards looms large.
In order to ensure that boards are up to the task investors and regulators expect
them to carry, the spotlight must shine more closely on the board as a whole,
and on its gatekeepers in particular.
This Article took the first step by bringing to light the issues currently
surrounding board gatekeepers’ independence. Yet, much more qualitative and
quantitative research is needed in order to better understand and address this key
corporate governance issue. With the proper attention, regulators and investors
could ensure that the guards are properly guarded.
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Appendix B
Number of Positive and Negative Designated Powers for Each Super Score
Note: This appendix shows the number of companies within each Super Score that

have been granted “positive” powers that provide an LID with the ability to act as
well as “negative” powers that have been qualified in some way either by limiting
language in terms of exclusivity or strength. There are twenty-five companies not
included within the graph that have an LID but were not granted any powers
(therefore, had a Super Score of 0). For example, this chart shows that there are
seven companies that have an LID that were allocated both a positive power and a
qualifying power resulting in a Super Score of 0. Additionally, there was only one
company with a Super Score of 1 that was allocated a positive power without an
offsetting negative power but eleven companies with a Super Score of 2.
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LID Power Prevalence for S&P 500

Appendix D
LID Power Prevalence by Market Cap
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Power Prevalence by Market Cap

Appendix F
Net Positive and Net Negative Super Scores
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Appendix G
IC Power Breakdown Across Market Cap

Appendix H
Average Number of Qualified Powers as a Percent of Total Powers Allocated
for LIDs

Appendix I
Average Number of Qualified Powers as a Percent of Total Powers Allocated
for Independent Chairs
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